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THE FORGOTTEN SOVEREIGNS 
TONYA KOWALSKI*
ABSTRACT
 Our federal system includes 564 federally recognized American In-
dian nations, most of which have their own sovereign lands, govern-
ments, and court systems, and who interact every day with the state 
and federal systems. Yet most legal thought overlooks our sovereign 
Native American nations and legal heritage. Although much of Amer-
ican law and policy intersects tribal jurisdictions, such issues general-
ly appear in the law school curriculum only in specialized, upper-level 
courses. This Article argues that the three-sovereign system should 
provide the fundamental framework for the United States legal sys-
tem across the legal curriculum and provides several concrete exam-
ples for how to introduce it. It also argues that many law courses 
should touch upon how their disciplines impact tribal jurisdictions 
and their citizens.  
 By changing our fundamental orientation toward the role of tribal 
sovereigns in the U.S. system, we will advance the academy’s goals of 
scholarship, teaching, and service. First, we will accurately represent 
to our students the true structure and diversity of our tripartite feder-
al system. Second, we can improve learning by using direct and com-
parative tribal perspectives for fundamental legal principles and me-
thods. Third, we can further the social justice mission of legal educa-
tion by raising awareness of tribal sovereignty among future advo-
cates and lawmakers. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
“Inherent sovereignty means having those rights like language and 
buffalo medicine, rights that form the very foundation of who we are 
as Kiowa people. Kiowas . . . hold these rights to be as self-evident and 
unalienable as those rights upon which the United States was origi-
nally founded. These are our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. Just as the founding fathers of the United States saw their 
rights to be endowed by their Creator, I too see my peoples’ rights to 
exist and govern as being endowed by my Creator.”1
— Chairman Billy Evans Horse 
“This rich legal tradition does not exist because it was recognized by 
the courts, . . . but rather because the tribes never ceased to act as so-
vereign peoples and never gave up their ‘old law.’ ”2
— Prof. Sidney L. Harring 
 Our federal system teems with literally hundreds of sovereign 
governments. But tell this to most law students, lawyers, or even law 
professors, and it is very likely you will receive a quizzical look in re-
sponse. In law school, most of us are taught to think of only one sove-
                                                                                                                    
 1. Billy Evans Horse & Luke E. Lassiter, A Tribal Chair’s Perspective on Inherent 
Sovereignty, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 79 (1997), reprinted in SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM 
AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS: A READER 33 (Robert Odawi Porter ed., 2005). Chairman 
Horse represents the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma. See id.
 2. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL
LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 292 (1994).  
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reign nation: the United States of America. At best, we sometimes al-
so think of the fifty states and the U.S. territories as having vestiges 
of their historical sovereignty. But very few people will think of our 
564 federally recognized American Indian nations,3 of which a great 
number have their own sovereign lands, governments, and court sys-
tems, and who interact every day with the state and federal systems. 
It is as though, through the centuries of systematic removal, assimi-
lation, and termination, our sovereign Native American nations and 
legal heritage simply have been forgotten. 
 Although we and our graduates are increasingly practicing in tri-
bal jurisdictions, rarely are they mentioned anywhere in the law cur-
riculum, save for specialized, upper-level courses in federal Indian 
law, gaming, and the like. As legal educators, we can help to redeem 
this long-standing problem by teaching our students within the 
three-sovereign federal framework, as well as by including some of 
the major intersections between tribal law,4 federal Indian law,5 and 
state law in our varied courses.  
                                                                                                                    
 3. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United 
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40218 (Aug. 11, 2009). 
 4. It is important to distinguish the federal law that governs the relationship be-
tween Native American nations and the national government from the internal law of Tri-
bal nations themselves. Internal tribal law is indigenous to the people; federal Indian law 
is law created by the United States and affects Indian nations and persons. See Cynthia 
Ford, Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1243, 1249 & n.20 (1996). 
 5. Choosing acceptable names to denote indigenous societies is often difficult. For 
example, although historically the word “Indian” is a colonial creation and has often been 
used in a pejorative sense, it is also a term of art within the U.S. Code that has been car-
ried over into many state and tribal legal systems. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 129-33 (4th ed. 2003). Lives are 
forever changed and entire cases rise and fall on federal-law definitions for the terms “In-
dian” and “Indian country.” See id. at 129-39. “Native American” is sometimes criticized as 
overly broad. JEFF CORNTASSEL & RICHARD C. WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD, at xiv (2008). “Tribe” is also 
sometimes criticized as pejorative because it tends to carry with it the racial connotations 
of “non-white” and “non-European.” See id. In this Article, I try to restrict the use of “In-
dian” to situations suggested by the historical context or by Indian status under federal 
law. The words “indigenous” and “Native” seem to be accepted widely in North American 
indigenous communities, but certainly they can never be perfect when used by outsiders. 
To demonstrate that these terms are intended to be used respectfully, they are capitalized 
here when used to describe peoples. The word “Aboriginal” is not used here, not only be-
cause it, too, can carry unintended pejorative connotations when used by nonindigenous 
persons, but also because the term could too easily confuse readers by summoning refer-
ences to the Indigenous peoples of Australia. “Indigenous” is probably the least controver-
sial term in popular use today and is gaining particular prominence in international law. 
Cf. LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 2 (1999) (using “indigenous peoples” in the global, international context). Accor-
dingly, although the terms are far from ideal, I tend to use “tribe,” “Native American,” and 
“Indian” or “American Indian” to connote the Indigenous peoples within the lower forty-
eight states and “indigenous” to refer to colonial-indigenous dynamics generally. 
 Because audience, tone, and professional voice are so critical to professional educa-
tion, professors probably should discuss with their students the problems inherent in 
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 Most law graduates enter practice with no significant exposure to 
federal Indian law, tribal law, or tribal government, even though In-
digenous nations are a rich feature of our nation’s legal landscape.6
Our collective lack of understanding about the relevance of tribal law 
and government to the national legal scene perpetuates itself in law 
firms, courts, and bar associations across the country.7 For example, 
how many law firms automatically screen all family law clients and 
cases involving children for Indian Child Welfare Act issues, includ-
ing tribal court jurisdiction?8 How many general business and  
contracts attorneys are familiar enough with tribal jurisdiction prob-
lems to foresee all the issues that arise when a nontribal entity con-
tracts with an Indian nation or conducts business within sovereign 
Indian borders? 
 Like most attorneys, I spent my educational and legal practice 
years ignorant of the vast, vibrant, growing world of tribal govern-
ments and courts thriving all around us. My eyes did not open until I 
was introduced to clinical teaching at a school that happened to have 
a leading Indian law program and clinic.9 I count myself fortunate 
that my lack of knowledge did not lead me on a collision course with 
malpractice as a former litigator. But more importantly, I feel grate-
ful for the richness I have now received, particularly for the awaken-
ing to the vast role that cultural literacy plays in effective and holis-
tic lawyering.10 We must not merely hope that our own students will 
be so lucky to encounter experiences and mentors to prepare them for 
this aspect of practice; instead, we should prepare them to practice in 
                                                                                                                    
screening and selecting ethnic, racial, and other social terminology that can have discrimi-
natory connotations or hidden biases, assumptions, and judgments. 
 6.  See Barbara P. Blumenfeld, Integrating Indian Law into a First Year Legal Writ-
ing Course, 37 TULSA L. REV. 503, 503-04 (2001). 
 7. Frank Pommersheim, “Our Federalism” in the Context of Federal Courts and Tri-
bal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts’ Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 
U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 124, 129 (2000) (arguing that we fail to prepare our students for 
practice when we perpetuate ignorance of the three-sovereign system, Tribal nations, and 
tribal courts).  
 8. See Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 504. 
 9. The Indian Legal Clinic at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona 
State University, Tempe, Arizona, is a division of the law school’s heralded, flagship Indian 
Legal Program, and it collaborates with the law school’s regarded and dynamic Clinical 
Program. Washburn University School of Law, which has one of the nation’s longest-
standing and acclaimed clinical programs, is also one of the few law schools to boast a Tri-
bal Law and Practice Clinic, under the design and leadership of Professor Aliza Organick. 
See generally Aliza G. Organick, Creating a Tribal Law Practice Clinic in Kansas: Carving 
the Peg to Fit the Hole, 82 N.D. L. REV. 849 (2006) (describing the process and challenges of 
creating a tribal court practice clinic). 
 10. Christine Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy and Ethic of Law/Lawyering for Indi-
genous Peoples, 82 N.D. L. REV. 863, 876-77, 892-93 (2006) [hereinafter Zuni Cruz, Toward  
a Pedagogy].
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a world in which tribal communities play a vibrant role, culturally, 
legally, politically, and economically.11
 By changing our fundamental orientation toward the role of  
tribal sovereigns in the United States, we can advance the academy’s 
goals of scholarship, service, and teaching. First, we can improve 
scholarship by fulfilling the imperative of accurately representing the 
true diverse structure of our tripartite federal system and teaching it 
across the curriculum. This will better prepare our future advocates 
and lawmakers, who will be increasingly confronted with issues in-
volving sovereignty in both domestic and international practice. 
 Second, we can fulfill the social justice component of our service 
imperative by introducing students early to the concept of strong, va-
lid, vibrant tribal courts and governments, as well as to some of the 
deeper aspects of their socio-historical underpinnings. In doing so, we 
can help to take the first, tentative steps toward ameliorating centu-
ries of their marginalization by the dominant legal system and the 
educational system that supports and forms it. This approach can al-
so make a small, but significant, step in creating a more welcoming 
and respectful educational environment for Native American stu-
dents and faculty.  
 Third, fulfilling these two imperatives provides numerous oppor-
tunities to improve teaching and learning by using direct and com-
parative tribal perspectives to introduce fundamental legal principles 
and methods. These teaching opportunities can be pursued in ways 
that are much less daunting than they may initially sound. 
 Parts I through V of this Article will illustrate the academic im-
peratives for introducing the “third sovereigns”12 across the entire 
law school curriculum and will also provide the very general legal 
background needed to understand its basic socio-historical underpin-
nings. Part VI will provide some suggestions for how to introduce tri-
bal legal studies and federal Indian law throughout students’ educa-
tional experience, after touching upon some basic pedagogical consid-
erations. It cites to many sources for assistance in teaching federal 
Indian law and tribal law in courses like Civil Procedure, Federal 
Courts, Property, and so on.  
 In order to accomplish these objectives, however, one first needs to 
develop a basic understanding of the historical doctrines that contin-
ue to shape federal Indian law, as well as the historical traumas that 
                                                                                                                    
 11. See Gabriel S. Galanda, A Need to Know Indian Law, OR. ST. B. BULL. 62, 62 
(2003) (arguing in favor of adding federal Indian law to the subjects tested on the Oregon 
bar examination) [hereinafter Galanda, A Need to Know Indian Law]; Gabriel S. Galanda, 
Reservations of Right: A Practitioner’s Guide to Indian Law, THE BRIEF 64, 68 (2002) [he-
reinafter Galanda, Reservations of Right]. 
 12. In a fair schema, Tribal nations would be called the first sovereigns! 
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arose from them.13 In particular, this Article will explore how the 
doctrine of discovery is embedded within the federal government’s 
stance toward tribal sovereignty and Native American peoples, and 
how it expressed itself through federal cultural assimilation pro-
grams. Because the history of federal-tribal relations is so marred by 
vast human-rights abuses, it would also do the readers, our students, 
and Native American communities a disservice not to recognize the 
ethnic and cultural genocide of Native American people14 when intro-
ducing these topics. 
 On a pragmatic level, this historical foundation is also relevant to 
the two imperatives of academic accuracy and social justice, as well 
as to the goal of improving teaching and learning. Understanding 
federal Indian law’s roots in the doctrine of discovery helps to illumi-
nate the source of the federal government’s ideological hostility to-
ward tribal sovereignty. An examination of the Supreme Court deci-
sions in which this doctrine is embedded, particularly Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, shows that this ideological thread endures. It also illumi-
nates how our tripartite state-federal-tribal system came to be. 
 Finally, the historical study below is also important to developing 
an appreciation for the traumatic contextual backdrop against which 
Native American Nations continue their struggle for wider recogni-
tion of their sovereignty as preexistent and independent of Western 
recognition.15 For legal educators of non-Native descent, understand-
ing even these few, select examples of federal assimilation policy may 
help to spark an internal posture of recognition and respect for the 
importance of sovereignty to Native American peoples. Increased 
awareness has direct relevance to legal educators and to our social 
justice mission because acknowledging that history is important to 
demarginalizing Native American students and faculty. 
 As it relates to the classroom experience itself, this history is a 
“new” topic for many of us and our students. The natural curiosity 
that results from cross-cultural examples has been proved to enhance 
learning. Furthermore, touching upon the history of tribal-federal re-
lations can demonstrate the centrality of social, racial, and cultural 
critique to legal studies and law practice. 
                                                                                                                    
 13. HARRING, supra note 2, at 7-10. 
 14. See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-
1976 The United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execu-
tion of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911,  
929-54 (2002).  
 15. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: 
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
191, 196-97 (2001) (arguing that Native peoples should locate the source of their sovereign-
ty from inside their own societies, rather than solely within the “dominant society’s ap-
praisal” of that sovereignty as arising from federal law). 
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 An examination of this shameful aspect of American legal history 
will inevitably be painful to encounter. But it has the potential to in-
spire future attorneys and policymakers to question legal structures 
and philosophies. The motivation to think critically about the law 
may encourage the law reform needed to prevent more human rights 
abuses on our soil. 
II.   LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.   “Discovering Heathen Lands” 
“[A]ll those . . . to whom this has been notified, have received and 
served their Highnesses, as lords and kings, in the way that subjects 
ought to do, with good will, without any resistance, immediately, 
without delay . . . But, if you do not do this, . . . I certify to you that 
with the help of God, we shall powerfully enter into your country, and 
shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, 
and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of 
their Highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and your children, 
and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of 
them as their Highnesses may command . . . .”16
— The Requierimento 
  At the heart of today’s tribal-federal relations is the colonial doc-
trine of discovery.17 A discussion of this doctrine contains unavoida-
ble references to Christianity in the sense of Christendom—in this 
context manifesting as a more harmful alliance between “secular 
princes and priestly authorities,”18 as opposed to the belief system of 
those who follow the Christian faith. From this point onward, refer-
ences to Christianity should be read in this way. According to Profes-
sor Michael Blumm and others, the doctrine actually was applied be-
fore the conquest of the New World via “the medieval Catholic 
Church’s efforts to impose the authority of the Pope over non-
Christian ‘heathens and infidels’ who occupied the Holy Lands of the 
Middle East.”19 The Church aimed to “replace the ruling infidels with 
Christian believers whose power would derive from, and be subject 
to, the Pope in Rome.”20 In Pagans in the Promised Land, Steven T. 
                                                                                                                    
 16. STEVEN T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE CHRISTIAN 
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY 34-36 (2008) (quoting directly from a Spanish decree made to In-
digenous peoples upon contact that contains the very essence of the colonial mindset 
shaped by the doctrine of discovery). 
 17. Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal So-
vereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy 
in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 713-14 (2004). 
 18. NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at ix. 
 19. Blumm, supra note 17, at 719. 
 20. Id.
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Newcomb outlines the origins of the doctrine of discovery, how it was 
imported and woven into the very fabric of U.S. property law, and the 
cognitive maps that underlie it. His central thesis is that federal In-
dian law is a “continental manifestation of the world-historical  
mission of [the Conqueror cognitive model] to bring all Creation into 
its domain.”21
 Newcomb’s work “cracks the code”22 behind the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh,23 in which the imperative of “disco-
verer’s title” encountered the obstacle of “Indian occupancy.”24 He ex-
plains that the United States’ stance toward Native Americans is 
“rooted in the idea . . . that the first ‘Christian people’ to discover 
lands inhabited by ‘heathens’ has ultimate dominion over and abso-
lute title to those lands,”25 an idea enshrined by Justice Marshall in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh. This thinking expressed itself time and again in 
the U.S. colonial policy of clearing the land of its indigenous popula-
tions so that it could be controlled and annexed, and it resulted in 
genocide in the form of unthinkable numbers of massacres.26 Wheth-
er one agrees about the extent to which the cognitive model of the 
Conqueror is embedded within key Supreme Court cases like John-
son v. M’Intosh, there can be no doubt that the central method of 
classifying Native American people as “subhuman” and “heathens” 
dominated large portions of U.S. law and policy during the assimila-
tion era. 
B.   Discovery as the Root of the Modern Tri-Sovereign System 
 While a study of the binary state/federal system can be ap-
proached from the Revolutionary era, the roots of the true, three-
sovereign federal model begin, from a Western standpoint, in the 
dawn of the invasion and conquest of the Americas. A holistic study 
of that age reveals several different Western thought streams at 
work, sometimes at odds and sometimes in tandem.27 Yet the com-
mon theme that emerges is that the conqueror model described by 
Newcomb provides the thread of continuity running through the con-
fused morass of federal jurisprudence regarding Indigenous peoples, 
                                                                                                                    
 21. NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at ix-x. 
 22. Id. at xi. 
 23. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 24. NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at xi. 
 25. Id. at 11. 
 26. William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Recon-
ciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 22-
25 (2003) [hereinafter Bradford, Reparations].
 27. Cf. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (2005); CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 18-118 (surveying an “un-
even history” from the colonial period, to removal and assimilation, to self-determination, 
to the “devolution” of federal programs to states and tribes); NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at 108. 
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in which the courts maddeningly tend to rule against Native inter-
ests even when it is plainly illegal or incongruous to do so.28 Accord-
ing to Newcomb, the influence of at least one Roman legal tradition, 
res nullus, allowed a sovereign to claim newly discovered lands when 
those lands had not been “subdued” by the peoples who lived there.29
The missionary fervor of the age of discovery added an additional re-
ligious component to the discovery doctrine that prevailed at the 
time, which was that nonbelievers were not entitled to any dominion 
over the lands they occupied.30 This principle is seen in the outra-
geous command of the Requierimento, a document addressed to the 
Indigenous peoples whom the Spanish government was determined 
to subdue, and which is quoted in part at the beginning of this Section. 
 Attempting to moderate this draconian stance, the Spanish jurist 
and theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, at first argued for greater rec-
ognition of Indigenous peoples as human beings as a matter of natu-
ral law, which would allow them to continue to occupy their homel-
ands despite their heathen status under divine law.31 De Vitoria’s 
views had some influence in the New World, leading to an early no-
tion of indigenous sovereignty32 that later influenced Anglo-
American legal philosophy and policy33 in its relatively few overtures 
toward tribal rights of self-determination. Although the United 
States engaged some Native nations on a loosely international basis 
during the early years of the treaty-making era,34 that posture seems 
to have had more to do with political expediency. Certain Indian na-
tions were still in a more powerful bargaining position than the colo-
nies. One oft-cited reason is that the fledgling United States feared 
that key Indian nations would side with foreign powers. This re-
mained true until the United States defeated Britain in the War of 
1812.35 In another example, around the time of the Declaration of In-
                                                                                                                    
 28. See generally DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT (1997) (describing the doctrinal patchwork underlying federal-to-tribal 
law as a series of “masks” used to soften the appearance of racial, ethnic, religious, and 
class oppression). Wilkins’s three classes of masks are the constitutional/treaty masks, ci-
vilizing/paternalistic masks, and nationalist/federalist masks. Id. at 8-16. See generally
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 33-45 (2005) (“A long-established 
language of racism that speaks of the American Indian as an uncivilized, lawless, and war-
like savage can be found at work throughout the leading Indian law decisions of the nine-
teenth-century U.S. Supreme Court.” (footnote omitted)). 
 29. NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at 104-07.  
 30. Id. at 107-10. 
 31. Id. at 108; see also ANGHIE, supra note 27, at 18. Quixotically, he later changed 
his stance, arguing that Indian peoples could not enjoy sovereignty because they were pa-
gans and therefore subject to Spanish and Christian war and subjugation. Id. at 26-28. 
 32. Blumm, supra note 17, at 720-21. 
 33. Id. at 721-23. 
 34. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 21.  
 35. See id. at 22, 25.  
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dependence, the new Americans needed protection and provisions 
from the Delaware (Lenni Lenape) People in order for their army to 
travel safely Westward over Delaware territories.36 The Treaty with 
the Delaware resulted.37
 As immigration, colonization, and statehood enveloped Indian 
lands and the new Americans became more powerful, better fed, and 
better armed, federal policy had the freedom to revert to its true phi-
losophical orientation toward Indigenous peoples: that it is the divine 
right and mandate of “civilized” peoples to dominate, subjugate, an-
nihilate, and assimilate Indigenous people culturally, linguistically, 
technologically, ethnically, racially, and spiritually.38 This dynamic is 
seen in the federal government’s primary use of the Protestant 
church as a weapon of assimilation.39 By fiat of Western law, the sta-
tus of Indian nations morphed to a new category of internal political 
sovereign,40 later defined as the “domestic dependent nation.”41 Al-
though some scholars have noted that outright, mass termination of 
Indian nations is no longer likely,42 the reality is that tribal political 
sovereignty remains under continual threat from the exercise of fed-
eral plenary power,43 which Newcomb traces directly to the doctrine 
                                                                                                                    
 36. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118-19 (2002) (discussing the evolution—and devolution—of North 
American colonial relations with the Native nations the colonials encountered). 
 37. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 22. 
 38. See WILKINS, supra note 28, at 1-18 (identifying three separate types of legal con-
sciousnesses or “masks” in the history of U.S. Supreme Court opinions affecting the federal 
government’s relationship with Native American nations: the constitutional/treaty mask, 
the civilizing/paternalistic mask, and the national/federal mask); see also ANGHIE, supra
note 27, at 13-31 (describing the same colonial orientation as applied to Indigenous peoples 
worldwide and demonstrating how colonial attitudes still are enshrined in international 
law); Blumm, supra note 17, at 719; Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as 
Collective Group Rights, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1990). 
 39. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cas-
es, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 773-87 (1997) (describing how the Board of Indian Commissioners 
used primarily Protestant missions to run agencies and schools to “civilize” the Indian). 
 40. In the case of Native American communities, it is crucial to distinguish political 
sovereignty from cultural sovereignty, which is immutable and interminable by any 
earthly power. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 220 (citing Dagmar Thorpe, Sovereign-
ty, A State of Mind: A Thakiwa Citizen’s Viewpoint, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 481, 481-84 
(1998-99)); Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 15, at 196-97. 
 41. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831). 
 42. See, e.g., Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 317, 340 (2006). 
 43. See, e.g., William Bradford, Beyond Reparations, An American Indian Theory of 
Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 66 (2005) [hereinafter Bradford, Beyond Reparations] (“[T]hat 
which Congress can give, Congress can take away. Any settlement of Indian claims must 
therefore be understood as dependent not upon the honor of the U.S. but rather upon the 
inconstant will of a majority of its legislative branch. Under the current legal regime, 
should a future Congress elect to reclaim monies paid as compensation, take property pur-
chased with such monies without paying compensation, or even terminate each and every 
Indian tribe, dissolve each and every reservation, and criminalize each and every aspect of 
Indian culture, nothing-nothing-save for any resulting moral outrage at such a naked as-
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of discovery.44 According to the plenary power doctrine, Indian na-
tions, as political entities, exist only at the sufferance of Congress: 
Congress is free to limit or terminate that sovereignty at will.45
 Although the Native nations’ power to self-govern is greatly 
eroded, their governments still retain the residual political power to 
control some of their internal affairs—for example, to contract with 
outside organizations and governments; to determine their own 
membership; to pass laws; to create courts; and to enforce tribal laws 
against members, resident Indians, and non-Indian entities that sub-
ject themselves to tribal law.46 That said, in many cases, these pow-
ers are overseen by a Bureau of Indian Affairs often described, in 
kinder words, as paternalistic.47 Historically, federal jurisprudence 
has recognized tribal power to self-govern under limited circums-
tances. For example, in the 1880s, the Supreme Court held that the 
Cherokee Nation was not required to adhere to federal grand jury re-
quirements guaranteed by the United States Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment.48 Similarly, in the late 1970s, the Court held that a Na-
vajo Nation member prosecuted in Navajo District Court was not 
protected by the federal Double Jeopardy Clause from prosecution for 
                                                                                                                    
sertion of power will stand in its way.”); Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 15, at 195 (“Given the 
dismal history of federal Indian policy, which includes among other things the disastrous 
termination policy of the 1950s, which sought to end the trust relationship with specific 
tribes and assimilate their members into the dominant society, it seems a bit optimistic to 
hope that Congress will always stop short of such annihilation. . . . [A]s the political tide 
turns against group-based rights and the distinctive status of Native peoples, it may well 
be that the optimists are a bit short-sighted.”). 
 44. See NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at 109-10. 
 45. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 439-61 (discussing the roots of the modern doc-
trine, including the landmark rulings in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 
(1913)); Bradford, Beyond Reparations, supra note 43, at 66 (“Under the doctrine of plenary 
power, Congress has nearly absolute and unreviewable dominion over Indian tribes, and, 
in concert with the political question doctrine, plenary power precludes judicial undoing of 
fraudulent treaties, proscribes the review of takings, insulates violations of treaty provi-
sions, and withdraws Indian property, culture, religion from the protection of the Constitu-
tion.”). Interestingly, Professor Merriam notes that during the early years of the Union, 
the concept of popular sovereignty was virulently opposed by the South because it under-
mined the basis for slavery. C.E. MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 
SINCE ROUSSEAU 168-69 (Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, Eds., The 
LawBook Exchange, Ltd., Union, N.J., Pub. 1999). By analogy, if Native American people 
have a right to self-govern, they cannot be so easily controlled. 
 46. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 219-414 (enumerating and describing in de-
tail the bases for the inherent sovereignty: the power to exclude from tribal boundaries, to 
create constitutions, to establish courts, to reject a governmental model based on the sepa-
ration of powers, to exercise sovereign immunity, to define membership, and to oversee 
elections); JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES
122 (2004).  
 47. See HARRING, supra note 2, at 13; WILKINS, supra note 28, at 166. 
 48. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
776 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:765 
the same offense by a separate sovereign in the United States Dis-
trict Court.49
 One key outgrowth of the paternal, top-down relationship imposed 
on the Tribes by the federal government is the unique relationship 
known as the federal trust responsibility: “The ‘trust relationship’—
or alternatively the ‘trust responsibility’ or ‘guardian-ward relation-
ship’—is loosely defined as the political relationship between federal-
ly recognized Indian tribes and their members and the federal gov-
ernment.”50 The trust relationship requires the federal government to 
provide many services to the Tribes, which can include beneficial tax 
status related to other governments, support from federal agencies 
like the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Health Service, Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, specified treaty rights, and so 
on.51 Even here, in a relationship that might to the uninitiated seem 
benign, the legacy of the discovery doctrine persists in that Native 
Americans fundamentally are viewed as less able than other cultures 
and races to manage their own affairs.52 This continued  
Euro-centrism is supported by Newcomb’s evidence that, in the realm 
of federal Indian law, the United States and Native American  
Nations often remain in a posture of Christian conqueror and  
heathen conquered.53
 So far, this Subsection has discussed sovereignty through the lens 
of the Western paradigm, which is still dominated by a fundamental 
orientation of conquest. As Newcomb and other indigenous scholars 
point out, even this agonizing history of political sovereignty can 
never take away the inherent right of self-determination54 often re-
ferred to as cultural sovereignty. According to Wallace Coffey and 
Professor Rebecca Tsosie, indigenous cultural sovereignty must be 
defined in indigenous terms, which varies among communities. 
Commonalities would likely include an emphasis on relationships 
and responsibilities among humans, their communities, the land, and 
all creation, as well as foundations in living indigenous tradition, 
such as oral history, lifeways, spirituality, and language.55 When we 
look at the sovereignty paradigm described by indigenous speakers 
                                                                                                                    
 49. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330-32 (1978) (superseded by statute). 
 50. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Commentary, Politics, History, and Semantics: The Fed-
eral Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487, 490 n.22 (2006) [hereinafter Fletch-
er, Politics, History, and Semantics].
 51. Id. at 490 & nn.22-28 (referencing citations to the U.S. Code).  
 52. See ANGHIE, supra note 27, at 55; CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at 3-83 
(describing how myths about Native Americans held by the dominant culture threaten to 
keep Native communities in marginalization). 
 53. NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at 125-27.  
 54. Id. at 112-13. 
 55. See generally Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 15 (describing an alternate model for 
conceptualizing tribal sovereignty in terms of inherent, collective rights and cultural conti-
nuity, rather than within the limited confines of modern political sovereignty). 
2009]                         THE FORGOTTEN SOVEREIGNS 777
and writers, we can see that at least pragmatically, Western-style po-
litical sovereignty surely is crucial to tribal communities’ survival in 
the modern era versus a hegemonic state/federal system. At the same 
time, defining indigenous collective rights merely in terms of political 
sovereignty is still another type of “received” construct, a “zero-sum 
game” that can do violence to the indigenous consciousness and way 
of life.56 The aspects of political sovereignty recognized by the U.S. 
federal government, at best, represent an uneasy truce that will 
hopefully one day be left behind, in favor of a truly plural legal sys-
tem characterized both by Western law and by the varied legal cul-
tures of the many tribal communities within the United States.57
C.   Assimilation as an Expression of the Discovery Doctrine 
“I believe in immersing the Indians in our civilization . . .  
and when we get them under, holding them there until they are  
thoroughly soaked.”58
— Colonel Richard Pratt, Founder, U.S. Training  
& Industrial School at Carlisle, Pennsylvania 
 If U.S. federal Indian law is based on the desire to fulfill the mis-
sion of the Conqueror cognitive model “to bring all Creation into its 
domain,”59 then the cultural means to that end are found in the many 
programs designed to achieve the total assimilation of Native Ameri-
can peoples. The underlying narrative of the Conqueror cognitive 
model formed the basis for laws enabling programs of assimilation. 
At the time, ethnic cleansing or assimilation of Indigenous peoples 
was considered an understandable byproduct of the right of dominion 
over conquered lands.60 As with almost any discussion of federal In-
dian law, the historical context is indispensable.61 Not only is it part 
of the narrative of modern Native American peoples, it is also one of 
the only sources of logical coherence in modern federal Indian law ju-
risprudence, which has been criticized as being in a state of disarray, 
often dishonest to any underlying principles that might favor Tribal 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty”—An Inappropriate Concept, in PEACE, POWER,
RIGHTEOUSNESS: AN INDIGENOUS MANIFESTO (1999), reprinted in SOVEREIGNTY,
COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS: A READER 67, 68 (Robert Odawi Porter  
ed., 2005). 
 57. HARRING, supra note 2, at 24.
 58. NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM 
PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-2000, at 215-16 (Peter Nabokov ed., Viking Penguin 
1999) (1978). 
 59. NEWCOMB, supra note 16, at x. 
 60. See Bradford, Reparations, supra note 26, at 22-25.  
 61. Dussias, supra note 39, at 775.  
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nations or people,62 and as something that the Supreme Court 
“makes . . . up as they go along.”63
 The federal government arguably began its formal assimilation 
policies regarding Native American children with the U.S. Board of 
Indian Commissioners’ “Civilization Fund” of 1819, which was devel-
oped to deal with the “Indian problem.”64 But in many ways it was a 
continuation of indoctrination programs put in place by the Spanish 
and pursued even earlier by private trading companies.65 Through 
that program, missionary organizations ran boarding schools de-
signed to remove children from their Tribes and families, often forci-
bly,66 including social conditioning,67 abduction,68 and extortion 
through the withholding of food rations,69 in order to “civilize” them.70
Their goal was to “kill the Indian [to] save the man within.”71 This 
assimilation program was accompanied and followed by transracial 
adoption programs also designed to achieve cultural genocide72 and 
ultimately to terminate Tribes as peoples and as nations.73 These pol-
icies are highlighted by the infamous “Peace Policy” era of 1869-
1882,74 but most people are shocked to learn that they continued well 
into the latter part of the twentieth century and that no significant 
congressional intervention occurred until the passage of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act of 1978.75
 One of the hallmarks was the forced conversion to Christianity 
through education policies: “[E]ducation ‘cuts the cord that binds [In-
dians] to a Pagan life, places the Bible in their hands, substitutes the 
true God for the false one, Christianity in place of idolatry . . . clean-
liness in place of filth, industry in place of idleness.’ ”76 In such 
schools, children’s names were changed, their language was forbid-
den, and their hair was cut short, “sometimes as part of a public ri-
                                                                                                                    
 62. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
579, 587-93 (2008) [hereinafter Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem].
 63. Id. at 579 (quoting Judge Roger L. Wollman). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 104-808, 15 (1996). 
 65. NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY, supra note 58, at 213 (citing the Virginia Company 
as one example).  
 66. Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation,
21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 59 (2008). 
 67. Id.
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 104-808, 15 (1996) (cited in Graham, supra note 66, at 48).  
 69. Id.
 70. Id.
 71. Graham, supra note 66, at 70. 
 72. Id. at 66-70. 
 73. Id. at 48 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-808, 15-16 (1996)). 
 74. See Dussias, supra note 39, at 777-84.  
 75. H.R. REP. NO. 104-808, 15-16 (1996).  
 76. See Dussias, supra note 39, at 783 & n.70 (quoting via other sources 1887
SUPERIN. OF INDIAN EDUC. ANN. REP. 131). 
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tual in which they renounced Indian origins.”77 A wide variety of edu-
cational literature of the time viewed these types of actions as neces-
sary to civilize and “Christianiz[e] children of pagans.”78 Similar poli-
cies of cultural assimilation or genocide have been used around the 
world to carry out the colonization of Indigenous peoples. Some of 
many such examples worldwide include China’s programs to erase or 
vilify the study of Tibetan language, culture, and religion among Ti-
betan schoolchildren.79 A common theme in the colonization of both 
Tibet (by China) and India (by Britain) was also the need to bring ci-
vilized religion or culture to a “backward” or “heathen” society.80
 The legacy of the discovery doctrine is not limited to North Ameri-
ca. The drive to assimilate and exterminate Indigenous peoples in 
order to colonize their lands has a powerful racial corollary in Aus-
tralian history. The infamous “Protector of the Aborigines,” A.O. Ne-
ville, who wielded considerable power over their lives, believed that 
“half-caste”81 children of mixed-race Aboriginal/White descent could 
be saved through racial cleansing, to be achieved by continued dilu-
tion of Aboriginal ancestry in successive generations. He published 
his views in his 1947 book, Australia’s Coloured Minority.82 It con-
tains disturbing multigenerational photographs83 designed to show 
the positive results of such cleansing (the “truths of biological assimi-
lation”).84 In one photo, an indigenous mother, her daughter, and 
grandson are shown from right to left. The grandmother’s features 
are identified as those of a person of full Aboriginal descent. Her 
daughter’s features are presented as more ambiguous. Her grandson, 
the boy on the left hand side of the photo, had features identified as 
strongly Caucasian. The boy on the left is promoted as the positive 
outcome, free to lead a life unburdened by the yoke of being ethnical-
ly different and inferior.85
                                                                                                                    
 77. NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY, supra note 58, at 216.  
 78. Id. at 214. 
 79. See RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CHINESE-OCCUPIED TIBET: A REPORT SUBMITTED 
TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 13-
14 (2001), available at http://www.tibetjustice.org/reports/final_brief_2001.html.  
 80. See Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 4 n.12 (2000).  
 81. Jennifer Clarke, Note, Cubillo v. Commonwealth, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 218, 231-32 
(2001) (discussing the use of “half-caste” as a legal term of art in Australian legal history). 
 82. A.O. NEVILLE, AUSTRALIA’S COLOURED MINORITY: ITS PLACE IN THE 
COMMUNITY (1947). 
 83. See Roslyn Poignant, The Photographic Witness?, 6 CONTINUUM: AUSTL. J. OF 
MEDIA & CULTURE (John Richardson ed., 1991), http://wwwmcc.murdoch.edu.au/ 
ReadingRoom/6.2/Poignant.html. 
 84. Id. (citations omitted).  
 85. See Alan Charlton, Conceptualizing Aboriginality: Reading A.O. Neville’s Austral-
ia’s Coloured Minority, AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL STUD., Fall 2001, at 47, 57 (“The argu-
ment, presumably, is that the offspring of a legalised union between white and ‘Coloured’ 
would more likely be accepted in white society, making it more likely again that these 
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 Assimilationist policies are not mere history. As just one of count-
less examples, the disintegration of cultural, tribal, and familial ties 
that resulted from “the stolen generations,”86 including the imposi-
tion of fundamental shame about race and identity, has resulted in 
entire generations of people experiencing deep conflict when consi-
dering how to identify themselves. My husband, who is partly of 
Chickasaw ancestry, recently spoke the names of his Chickasaw an-
cestors out loud as he read them from the tribal enrollment docu-
ments that his grandmother had assembled for her family. After a 
period of hesitance about not feeling “authentic enough,” he found 
the resolve to enroll in the Chickasaw Nation when he encountered 
the insidiously captioned photographs from A.O. Neville’s book. He 
spoke of his initial uncertainty when reconnecting with his Nation 
and explained his reasons for enrolling even though family history, 
geography, and a culture of assimilation had separated his mother 
from her own mother for most of their lives: 
This feeling of doubt would have pleased Mr. Neville, and those 
like him, because their policies instilled it within us, like a time-
release capsule full of shame. If I hadn’t enrolled, then I’d be the 
“boy on the left.” I’d reinforce the shame that surrounded my 
grandmother when she lost custody of my mom as an “unfit moth-
er.” I would have reinforced the racial attitudes my mother faced 
from some of her relatives. If I hadn’t enrolled, a part of me would 
always have been missing. That part is the Tribal line of people, 
culture, and blood that I would have rejected.87
 Assimilation policies were not limited to children. The United 
States also used missionaries for another nefarious purpose: to en-
force on Indian lands the widespread bans on Native religious prac-
tices as “savage . . . and heathenish.”88 Federal policy actually crimi-
nalized such spiritual rites as the Sioux Sun Dance, the activities of 
religious leaders, and the possession of ceremonial objects.89 The ear-
ly 1900s saw the outlawing or suppression of many Pueblo dances 
                                                                                                                    
children would later be able to interbreed within white society. . . . [Neville] states that he 
sees colour prejudice as ‘the main stumbling-block towards assimilation.’ The effort to 
overcome this white prejudice by organising marriages so that the ‘colour’ is eventually 
‘bred out’ seems a case of destroying the race so that it may be saved. One obvious tenet of 
the Neville plan is that Aborigines must be remade in some way, so as to fit them for  
a new, assimilated life. Equally obvious is that this plan is to be imposed upon them, re-
gardless of their opinion on the matter[.]” (citations omitted) (citing NEVILLE, supra note 
82, at 72)). 
 86. “Stolen generations” is the term usually applied to the victims of assimilation and 
boarding school programs in Australia and Canada. T.S. Twibell, Rethinking Johnson v. 
M’intosh (1823): The Root of the Continued Forced Displacement of American Indians De-
spite Cobell v. Norton (2001), 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 129, 196 (2008). 
 87. Personal narrative of Kent Corkum (on file with author). 
 88. Bradford, Reparations, supra note 26, at 44. 
 89. Dussias, supra note 39, at 788-89. 
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considered to be “evil.”90 In a sort of twisted irony, authorities actual-
ly used the tribally based (but federally created) Courts of Indian Of-
fenses to criminally punish their own members for engaging in such 
spiritual practices91 so fundamental to their identities, life ways, and 
survival. It was not until the late 1970s that Congress enacted the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), which declared a 
policy to protect and promote Native American religious traditions.92
Even then, AIRFA is only a first step, as it contains no enforcement 
provisions.93
 To summarize, the foundations of tribal sovereignty arise fore-
most out of our First Peoples’ inherent sovereignty, which contains 
not just a political component derived from a history of international 
relations and self-governance, but also from cultural sovereignty and 
the collective right to self-determination as peoples. To understand 
how both kinds of sovereignty have come under attack from hostile 
state and federal governments, it is important to understand that the 
United States have actually committed many undisputed acts of cul-
tural and ethnic genocide against its Native American nations. Final-
ly, as legal educators and legal reformers, we should realize that the 
roots of continued state and federal hostility toward Native American 
nations lie in the doctrine of discovery, and if that dynamic is to 
change, so must the entire underlying worldview. 
III.   THE SOCIAL JUSTICE IMPERATIVE
“[T]he minority voice is the most important voice to consider. The mi-
nority voice expresses the things that are going wrong, . . . the things 
that we’re being aggressive about or trying to overlook and sweep un-
der the carpet or shove out the door. One of the things our leaders said 
is that if you ignore this minority voice it will create conflict in your 
community and this conflict is going to create a breakdown that’s 
going to endanger everyone.”94
— Jeannette Armstrong 
 Introducing students early to the concept of strong, valid, vibrant 
tribal courts and governments can help to form the first, tentative 
steps toward ameliorating centuries of their marginalization in the 
                                                                                                                    
 90. Id. at 802. 
 91. Id. at 792, 802; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 340. 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006). 
 93. See Alfonso Ortiz, American Indian Religious Freedom: First People and the First 
Amendment, 19.4 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 26, 26 (1995). 
 94. Jeannette Armstrong, An Okanagan Worldview of Society, in ORIGINAL 
INSTRUCTIONS: INDIGENOUS TEACHINGS FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 66, 69-70 (Melissa K. 
Nelson ed., 2008). 
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legal system and in the educational system that supports and forms 
it. First, acclimating students to a culture of social justice and com-
munity lawyering arguably is one of the primary missions of legal 
education.95 As Professor Sedillo Lopez has observed, it should be 
axiomatic that any good professional should have among her skills 
the ability to reflect on how to improve the legal system of which she 
is a vital part.96 To vindicate that mission, we should continually in-
novate in our educational goals and methods.97
 What we choose to include in the mandatory, first-year  
curriculum is much more important in articulating this message 
about priorities than which courses we offer as electives, even though 
both are essential.98 While we cannot address all of the unlimited ex-
amples of social justice concerns in the classroom, we can incorporate 
examples to illustrate some of the forces that create injustice in our 
world, such as racism. What students need to hear early in their law 
school experience is that these issues are important to the elite of 
their profession: 
Students are learning not only from the courses they take but also 
from the moral culture or atmosphere of their classrooms and the 
law school campus more broadly. . . . 
In law school, students learn from both what is said and what is 
left unsaid. There is a message in what the faculty address and 
what they do not. When faculty routinely ignore—or even explicitly 
rule out-of-bounds—the ethical-social issues embedded in the cases 
under discussion, whether they mean to or not, they are teaching 
students that ethical-social issues are not important to the way 
                                                                                                                    
 95. See Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a Clinical Setting: The 
Effect of Specialization on Social Justice and Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307, 314 
nn.50-51 (2001). 
 According to Professors Baillie and Bernstein-Baker, several roots gave rise to the 
philosophy that law schools have a duty to inculcate in students a commitment to bettering 
the public interest. They range from the inherent, historical values of the professional 
community to the inclusion of public service in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
James L. Baillie & Judith Bernstein-Baker, In the Spirit of Public Service: Model Rule 6.1, 
The Profession and Legal Education, 13 LAW & INEQ. 51, 64-66 (1994). The social justice 
mission was heightened by the renaissance of clinical legal education during the Civil 
Rights Era. Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV.
1461, 1465 (1998); see also WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 92 (2007). Nevertheless, the idea of lawyering 
for social change remains “counter-cultural” in law school and in law practice. William P. 
Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 7, 9-
11 (2007). 
 96. Sedillo Lopez, supra note 95, at 310 n.19. 
 97. Professor Sedillo Lopez distinguishes between the social justice mission—the deci-
sion to impact our students and communities in a certain way—and educational goals, 
which are the methods for creating that impact. Id. at 310 n.15. 
 98. Cf. Anita Bernstein, On Nourishing the Curriculum with a Transnational Law 
Lagniappe, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 578, 578-79 (2006) (making similar arguments in support of 
including transnational law in the first-year curriculum). 
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one ought to think about legal practice . . . with important long-
term effects on how they approach their work.99
Professor Zuni Cruz has observed that some culturally based instruc-
tion is important to teaching for social justice: 
[C]ritical “literacy” skills that will allow [law students] to “read” 
the world, both Indian and non-Indian are useful for achieving so-
cial justice work. Cultural literacy, in particular is an important 
pedagogical tool for indigenous peoples and those who seek to work 
on their behalf as legal professionals.100
By incorporating this pedagogical tool, law professors help to train 
students in the profession’s expectations for their behaviors and atti-
tudes, including culturally sensitive practice.101 For example, as it re-
lates to professionalism, promoting respect for tribal institutions aids 
students by training them against the kinds of culturally insensitivi-
ty occasionally displayed by non-Native attorneys practicing in tribal 
court.102
 As scholars and teachers, when we accept the responsibility to 
address social injustices against Native American communities, we 
can do something, regardless of our backgrounds, to support and 
nourish outsiders’ awareness of Indigenous peoples:  
                                                                                                                    
 99. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 140; see also ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 129 (2007). 
 100. Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 10, at 901. 
 101. See Pamela Edwards & Sheila Vance, Teaching Social Justice Through Legal 
Writing, 7 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 63, 66-67 (2001). 
 102. Ford, supra note 4, at 1260-61 (“Including Indian law in the mainstream Civil 
Procedure course work also should help inculcate in future lawyers appropriate respect for 
the tribal courts and tribal judges, just as those same future lawyers absorb their profes-
sors’ attitudes towards state and federal courts and judges. Currently, many tribal court 
judges report that the nonreservation attorneys who appear before them seem to have lit-
tle regard for the tribal courts in general and their judges in particular.”). In her article, 
Ford shared her personal experiences as a tribal court judge as well as her conversations 
with other tribal court judges: 
 I observed this attitude during my service as Chief Judge for the Suquamish 
Tribal Court of the Port Madison Reservation in Washington state, even though 
I am both law-trained and non-Indian. I have heard many other tribal court 
judges express this sentiment. Most recently, at a conference in July 1995, en-
titled Dispensing Justice in Indian Country: Preserving Tribal Sovereignty 
Through Judicial Decision Making, a group of tribal court judges repeated this 
complaint. One of them stated that her tribe had never had a separate bar ex-
amination for admission to practice in its courts, but because so many attor-
neys appearing in her court had not even bothered to read the pertinent sec-
tions of the tribal code and the court’s rules of procedure, she now advocated 
such an examination. Even federal judges are not immune from this attitude. 
This attitude does a disservice both to the tribal courts and to the clients whose 
cases are to be decided by them. Bluntly stated, it reflects an abhorrent combi-
nation of lawyerly arrogance and racism, whether conscious or not, as well as 
poor judgment. 
Id. at 1261 n.66. 
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Engaging students and academicians in the study, research, and 
understanding of indigenous justice systems and law creates a 
space for intellectual strengthening of ideas, and critical analysis 
of present structures of law and justice operating in Indian coun-
try, an essential component of true indigenous self-determination.103
We should not leave this task up to the professors who teach upper-
level federal Indian law courses. Nor should these issues be left to 
professors of Color alone.104 Including ethical-social issues like race 
and colonialism in our classroom conversations helps to avoid stu-
dents’ serious critique that “law schools create people who are smart 
without a purpose.”105
 As law professors, we should seek to engage all of our students, 
including those who are culturally or otherwise alienated by tradi-
tional, Eurocentric models of education. Several scholars have noted 
that acknowledging the mostly ignored contributions of Native Amer-
icans to our historical and legal landscape helps to demarginalize our 
Native students.106 For example, I read a very moving comment on a 
teacher evaluation from my first year in which the student expressed 
relief and appreciation for the inclusion of tribal government in the 
curriculum.107
 This type of acknowledgement plays a great role in perhaps the 
most significant expression of the effort to demarginalize Native 
American law students: the attempt to increase their numbers on 
campus and retain them when they arrive. Many of these students 
play an integral part in the survival of their communities in the face 
of a government and society that, historically, has often sought either 
to annihilate or to completely disempower them.108 According to the 
latest data from the American Bar Association, in the 2008-2009 
academic year, there were 1,198 enrolled law students who self-
identified as American Indian or Alaska Native.109 Compare this to 
the latest census data, which indicates that the indigenous popula-
                                                                                                                    
 103. Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 10, at 884. 
 104. See infra note 144. 
 105. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 142. 
 106. E.g., Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 505-06. 
 107. The student, who both humorously and poignantly described herself as “Black and 
White and Red all over,” expressed joy at the brief moment of demarginalization, noting 
that it was one of the only times she felt that contributions from her cultural heritage were 
considered relevant to the study of law. 
 108. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Law School Training of American Indians as Legal-
Warriors, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 5, 42-45, 50-56 (1996). 
 109. American Bar Association, American Indian or Alaska Native J.D. Enrollment 
1971-2009, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%2011.pdf (last vi-
sited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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tion of the federally recognized Tribes and Alaska Native communi-
ties alone is just under two million.110
 To say that tribal governments should be included in the curricu-
lum is not to exclude other minority students. Members of Native 
American communities have a unique legal standing in the nation—a 
standing that touches upon virtually every area of law. By virtue of 
the federal trust responsibility and treaty relationship with Indian 
nations, Indian peoples arguably are the only people with a legally 
defined racial and ethnic status.111 Moreover, addressing social jus-
tice issues through “outsider stories” also benefits students who come 
from the dominant culture, as well as those who identify with other 
“outsider groups.”112
 The atmosphere of acknowledgment that is so crucial to the de-
marginalization, recruitment, retention, and respect of Native Amer-
ican law students is especially important in the first weeks of the 
students’ law school experience, including law school orientation. 
These weeks are “a critical juncture that can create a sense of inclu-
sion and belonging, or repeat patterns of alienation that plague stu-
dents who have been historically excluded from higher education.”113
Recognizing non-Anglo American legal systems early in law school 
can contain surprising symbolic power: “Subordinated peoples in co-
lonial and neocolonial situations not only contend with social institu-
tions of dominance. They also face symbolic dominance, for example, 
ideologies that reflect cultural constructions of the dominant order 
and that rationalize that order. These rationalizations may come to be 
unconsciously accepted . . . .”114
 In conclusion, educational theorists posit “communities of prac-
tice” as a key element facilitating effective learning.115 For better or 
worse, as the key symbolic guides of those learning communities, law 
professors usually serve as their students’ first role models for pro-
fessional behavior.116 They have the opportunity to instill respect for 
Native American peoples and sovereigns.117 We, as academics, both 
Native and non-Native, can take small but significant steps toward 
                                                                                                                    
 110. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF TRIBAL 
SERVICES, AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE REPORT, at i-ii (2003), 
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/text/idc-001777.pdf.  
 111. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 119, 129-37. 
 112. Edwards & Vance, supra note 101, at 64. 
 113. Paula Lustbader, You Are Not in Kansas Anymore: Orientation Programs Can 
Help Students Fly over the Rainbow, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 331 & n.19 (2008) (appearing 
in an issue devoted to Washburn’s recent Humanizing Legal Education Symposium). 
 114. LORETTA FOWLER, TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION, at
xvii (2002). 
 115. SARAH LEBERMAN ET AL., THE TRANSFER OF LEARNING: PARTICIPANTS’
PERSPECTIVES OF ADULT EDUCATION AND TRAINING 2 (2006). 
 116. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 156. 
 117. Ford, supra note 4, at 1260. 
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healing the legal marginalization of Native Americans when we en-
courage and mentor this and other types of cultural literacy. 
IV.   ACADEMIC ACCURACY
“The judicial systems of the three sovereigns—the Indian  
tribes, the Federal government, and the States—have much to  
teach one another. While each system will develop along different 
lines, each can take the best from the others. Just as a ‘single  
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .’ 
for the development of laws, the experiments and examples provided 
by the various Indian tribes and their courts may offer models for the 
entire nation to follow.”118
— The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor 
 The United States is a three-sovereign legal system. When intro-
ducing new students to the fundamental concepts underlying this 
system, scholarly accuracy requires us to include Tribal nations and 
courts in any general discussion. Thus, while comparative tribal legal 
studies are an excellent vehicle to teach many topics, introducing 
them is also a matter of important academic and historic accuracy as 
well as of curricular integrity.119
 No instruction on the U.S. legal system can be complete without 
mention of the “third” sovereigns: the 564 federally recognized120 In-
dian nations within U.S. borders, all of which have the innate right 
to self-determination121 as well as limited governmental sovereignty 
                                                                                                                    
 118. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 
TULSA L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997) (citation omitted and emphasis added) (quoting in part New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 310, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 119. See Rennard Strickland & Gloria Valencia-Weber, Observations on the Evolution 
of Indian Law in the Law Schools, 26 N.M. L. REV. 153, 161 (1996) (“As a matter of  
integrity in the curriculum, Indian law should be taught as the indigenous sovereigns  
and their laws have a continuity which precedes the creation of federal and state law  
in the United States.”). 
 120. US Department of the Interior Indian Affairs, http://www.bia.gov (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2009). There are also anywhere from dozens to hundreds of Native American tri-
bes within the borders of the United States that have not been recognized by the govern-
ment for purposes of federal law. See WILKINS, supra note 28, at 2 (“The quoted figure does 
not include state-recognized tribes, nor does it include the more than one hundred nonre-
cognized groups which are in the process of petitioning the federal government in the hope 
of securing federal recognition.”). Denial of federal recognition destroys these communities’ 
ability to obtain the benefits of the federal government’s trust responsibility. See Fletcher, 
Politics, History, and Semantics, supra note 50, at 490 n.22.  
 121. E.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 22 (Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz 
ed., 1979). 
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according to the current state of federal law.122 Many of them have 
their own governments,123 court systems,124 and integral borders,125
and yet they are largely ignored by the law school curriculum.126
 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized the tri-sovereign na-
ture of our federal system in a 1997 speech: 
Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign enti-
ties—the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes. 
Each of the three sovereigns has its own judicial system, and each 
plays an important role in the administration of justice in this 
country. The part played by the tribal courts is expanding. As of 
1992, there were about 170 tribal courts, with jurisdiction encom-
passing a total of perhaps one million Americans.127
Federal, state, and tribal jurisprudence is replete with cases and leg-
islation documenting the tug of war between the three types of gov-
ernment over competing sovereign interests.128 Despite the existence 
of these nearly 600 sovereign Tribal nations within U.S. borders, only 
one of the most popular legal method textbooks, Professor Calleros’ 
Legal Method and Writing, significantly notes the relevance of Na-
tive American nations and courts in its chapter on U.S. governments 
and court systems.129
                                                                                                                    
 122. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
INDIAN NATIONS 241-303 (2005) (providing a big-picture overview of the evolving nature of 
tribal sovereignty today). 
 123.  RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 46, at 41-72. 
 124. See id. at 89-112. 
 125. As Professor Blumenfeld notes, even those states without reservations may  
have substantial numbers of Native communities. See Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 504-05  
& nn.2-3. 
 126. The legal writing curriculum is just starting to evolve into acknowledging Tribal 
nations at those law schools with strong, highly regarded Indian and tribal law programs 
like those at Arizona State University and the University of New Mexico. At New Mexico, 
for example, legal writing director Barbara Blumenfeld uses writing assignments based on 
federal Indian law problems to help introduce them to the topic early in their careers. See 
generally id. (describing how to introduce first-year law students to federal Indian law 
through legal writing assignments). This gradual evolution is possible wherever there are 
open minds. At Washburn University School of Law, Professors Michael Hunter Schwartz, 
Aliza Organick, and I are collaborating on materials to very briefly introduce the three-
sovereign system in Schwartz’s groundbreaking, week-long orientation program for new 
first-year students, which is based on his Expert Learning for Law Students system and 
textbook. See MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, EXPERT LEARNING FOR LAW STUDENTS (2005). 
Professor Blumenfeld already has been doing so for quite some time during the orientation 
program at New Mexico. Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 509 n.20. 
 127. O’Connor, supra note 118, at 1.  
 128. See generally, e.g., CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5 (arguing that racism and 
other social constructs lie at the heart of contemporary federal-tribal and state-tribal ten-
sions concerning gaming, taxation, land, and so on); WILKINS, supra note 28 (exposing the 
history of federal jurisprudence concerning Indian nations as an arm of mostly anti-Indian 
federal policy). 
 129. CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 23 (5th ed. 2006). 
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 There is an increasing call among legal scholars familiar with fed-
eral Indian and tribal law to introduce it to students across the curri-
culum.130 The arguments for increasing students’ exposure to federal 
Indian law topics even during the first year come from many sources: 
more states now are testing federal Indian law on their  
respective bar exams;131 our students increasingly are encountering 
federal Indian and tribal law issues in practice and are appearing in 
tribal courts;132 the psychology of learning suggests that students  
enjoy better comprehension and retention when learning is based  
on surprising and fresh examples from unexpected places;133 and 
comparative legal studies have the potential to increase skill in criti-
cal thinking.134
 Professor Frank Pommersheim is one of a number of scholars to 
challenge the academy to make right its oversight of the three-
sovereign system, noting that our collective failure to “identify and 
discuss the tribal sovereign, particularly tribal courts, seriously re-
stricts, even distorts, the purview of contemporary federalism.”135
                                                                                                                    
 130. See generally Symposium, Native American Law Essays on Integrating Indian 
Law into Law School Curricula, 37 TULSA L. REV 481 (2001) (collecting essays on the inte-
gration of federal Indian law into the law school curriculum); Symposium, The Pedagogy of 
American Indian Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 605 (2006) (compiling articles on the pedagogy of 
federal Indian law). 
 131. See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber & Sherri Nicole Thomas, When the State Bar 
Exam Embraces Indian Law: Teaching Experiences and Observations, 82 N.D. L. REV. 741 
(2006) (describing how federal Indian law came to be tested on the New Mexico bar exami-
nation and how it impacted the teaching of that subject at the University of New Mexico 
School of Law). As of this writing, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Washington test federal 
Indian law. See Rules for the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners § 15-203(B)(8) (2007), 
available at http://www.nmexam.org/rules/rules203.htm; South Dakota Unified Judicial 
System, New Indian Law Question on Bar Exam, http://www.sdjudicial.com/ 
index.asp?category=news&nav=8&record=126 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); Washington 
State Bar Association, Washington State Bar Examination Subjects, 
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/licensing/bar_examination_instructions_2.htm (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2009). Similar movements are underway in Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Valencia-Weber & Thomas, supra, at 754. According to 
a recent blog, the Multistate Performance Test (MPT), a practical skills component, recent-
ly consisted of a case file requiring the student to analyze and resolve a tribal court juris-
diction problem. Posting of Matthew L.M. Fletcher to Turtle Talk, 
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2008/01/18/july-2007-ny-state-bar-exam-indian-law-question 
(Jan. 18, 2008, 3:04 A.M.). The MPT is required in thirty-two states. NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS AND ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS 
TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS 21 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/Comp_Guide/CompGuide.pdf. 
 132. See Galanda, Reservations of Right, supra note 11, at 68. 
 133. Cf. Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The 
Case of the “Gypsies”, 103 YALE L.J. 323, 332 n.20 (1993) (“In his comparative law classes 
Weyrauch found that students were persistently more interested in tribal law than in the 
laws of western Europe.”). 
 134. See Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 101, 105-06 (1989); Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some 
Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 264-66 (2005).  
 135. Pommersheim, supra note 7, at 124. 
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Even though our omissions may, until now, have been inadvertent, 
we can no longer claim to accurately teach the federal system with-
out discussing the tribal sovereigns and courts and the Supreme 
Court’s activities in that area.136 In the Sections below, this Article 
will provide the core knowledge base and tools for doing so.  
 Moving beyond the issue of accuracy and into the pedagogical in-
centives, “treating a whole category of domestic legal systems as in-
visible”137 fails our students by establishing a cracked foundation and 
distorted framework for analyzing legal problems: 
With continued economic development on tribal lands, our stu-
dents are increasingly likely to represent clients who will interact 
with tribal governments or private entities and perhaps litigate in 
tribal courts, even if the students do not intend to practice in tribal 
communities. Nonetheless, students might easily miss that point 
unless they are introduced fairly early in their legal education to 
the values and needs of Native American communities or at least 
the existence and method of their legal systems.138
 In addition to teaching the federal law that impacts Native Amer-
ican people and nations, the internal, indigenous law of Tribes over-
flows with rich comparative legal studies that can be used to enhance 
comprehension and retention, not to mention cultural literacy skills. 
For example, since I began using tribal law and government as a 
comparative system for teaching fundamental concepts in legal anal-
ysis, such as sources of law, paths of review, and types of authority, 
many of my students more quickly absorb these concepts on a much 
deeper, intuitive level, rather than memorizing them in rote. As a re-
sult, their professional judgment about choices such as which author-
ities to cite is developing at a much faster pace, allowing us to spend 
more time on advanced topics. Even better, the comparative study 
also provides a valuable opportunity for increasing cultural literacy 
through the appreciation of diversity in societal structures in differ-
ent sovereign states, such as constitutions and court systems, as well 
as the cultural groundwater from which they spring. 
 The Journal of Legal Education recently completed a multi-issue 
exploration on integrating transnational law into the legal curricu-
lum.139 It seems that many U.S. law schools are considering adapting 
the legal curriculum for a more global environment even before re-
cognizing, in those same courses, the importance of an enormous and 
                                                                                                                    
 136. Id.
 137. Charles Calleros, In the Spirit of Regina Austin’s Contextual Analysis: Exploring 
Racial Context in Legal Method, Writing Assignments and Scholarship, 34 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 281, 284 (2000) [hereinafter Calleros, Exploring Racial Context].
 138. Id.
 139. Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Mark Tushnet, From the Editors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC.
477, 477 (2006). 
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influential comparative legal system within our own borders.140 Many 
of the reasons asserted for globalizing the curriculum are strikingly 
similar: our students are increasingly encountering transnational is-
sues in practice; professionalism requires a less isolationist perspec-
tive; professionalism requires the ability to respectfully and compe-
tently navigate unfamiliar legal rules and court systems; law schools 
have an obligation to imbue their students with the kind of civic re-
sponsibility and moral/ethical compass necessary to navigate the 
global landscape; and comparative study encourages our future law-
yers’ thoughtfulness about law reform.141
Best Practices for Legal Education identifies “[a] commitment to 
justice” as the first principle of professionalism.142 When the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching produced its study on 
legal education, it identified six major goals, one of which is 
“[f]orming students able and willing to join an enterprise of public 
service.”143 One way in which law professors can help to further a 
commitment to justice and public service is to take incremental steps 
toward ameliorating the long history of oppression and marginaliza-
tion of Native peoples by legal entities.144
                                                                                                                    
 140. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 98, at 578-79 (“ ‘[I]t is important for first-year law stu-
dents to gain experience in transnational law, both for purposes of their later legal educa-
tion and to prepare them for the kind of law practice that they are likely to engage in after 
graduation.’ ” (quoting American Association of Law Schools, 2006 Annual Meeting Pro-
gram Brochure, What is Transnational Law and Why Does it Matter?)). 
 141. Cf. id. at 581-86 (critiquing the different types of provincialism found in the U.S. 
legal curriculum with respect to transnational law); Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transna-
tional Legal Perspectives into the First Year Civil Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL ED.
479, 481-84 (introducing the various arguments for incorporating a “transnational perspec-
tive” into Civil Procedure).  
 142. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 99, at 84-85. 
 143. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 22. The other five goals are “[d]eveloping in 
students the fundamental knowledge and skill, especially an academic knowledge base and 
research,” “[p]roviding students with the capacity to engage in complex practice,” 
“[e]nabling students to learn to make judgments under conditions of uncertainty,” 
“[t]eaching students how to learn from experience,” and “[i]ntroducing students to the  
disciplines of creating and participating in a responsible and effective professional commu-
nity.” Id.
 144. In any outsider’s effort to help correct the injustices levied on a different commu-
nity, we must face the risk of doing harm rather than good. It is crucial not to speak for the 
community or to assume its wants and needs; the community must be consulted. This ethi-
cal code comports with modern clinical law practice and pedagogy. See Sedillo Lopez, supra
note 95, at 325 (noting that one of the values of community-based clinics is to expose stu-
dents to holistic problem solving, rather than assuming an understanding of the client’s 
problem and desired outcomes).  
 The risk of well-intentioned blundering is multiplied manifold when taking actions 
that impact indigenous communities. Because Indigenous peoples are too often either ro-
manticized or targeted for assimilation, it is too easy for even the well-intentioned scholar 
to make biased assumptions and self-concerned decisions about how to interact with those 
they wish to understand or assist. One glaring example is the harm wrought by anthropol-
ogists and other academics and researchers on indigenous communities worldwide, which 
continues today despite wider-spread recognition and attempts to remedy the problem. Cf.
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 Before proceeding, it may help to understand some of the possible 
reasons why the academy historically has omitted indigenous law 
and government from mainstream legal studies. First, one pragmatic 
concern could be that the law curriculum already is bursting at the 
seams and that it is unrealistic to think that we can expose our stu-
dents to everything they might need to know in practice. Fortunate-
ly, the gap between desire and reality may not be as large as we im-
agine. In fact, there may be unexpected benefits and cost savings 
down the road. In my experience, adding the third sovereign actually 
does far more to enhance students’ understanding of law and legal 
methods than to cloud it. As a result, future instructors will inherit 
students more able to transfer their learning from the previous con-
text into the current one.  
 Students and professors do not need to plumb the depths of feder-
al Indian or tribal law to understand that our federal system also in-
cludes many tribal sovereigns and that the intersections between so-
vereigns create interesting issues in diverse topics like child custody, 
business transactions, taxation, and criminal jurisdiction. As Profes-
sor Cynthia Ford has observed, “continued brief discussion of Indian 
law connections throughout the required curriculum should sensitize 
students to look for Indian law issues in cases,” making them more 
likely to identify the need for further self-education or to associate an 
expert in the field.145
 Second, another reason for forgetting the third sovereigns may be 
reluctance to engage the socially challenging aspects of the material. 
Professor Grijalva suggests that what may lie at the heart of this re-
ticence is actually anxiety146 or the fear of the unknown.147 The exoti-
                                                                                                                    
VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 78-100 (1969) (providing an indigenous 
perspective on the folly of colonial and neo-colonial anthropology with respect to Indigen-
ous peoples). See generally DEVON A. MIHESUAH, NATIVES AND ACADEMICS: RESEARCHING 
AND WRITING ABOUT AMERICAN INDIANS (1998) (collecting viewpoints on proper methods 
for researching and writing about Native American people); SMITH, supra note 5 (proposing 
methods for decolonizing research about Indigenous peoples); SHAWN WILSON, RESEARCH
IS CEREMONY: INDIGENOUS RESEARCH METHODS (2008) (proposing a uniquely indigenous 
approach to such research).  
 Here, too, there is a risk that a law professor writing about how to incorporate tribal 
legal concepts into the mainstream legal writing curriculum may overstep her role and risk 
telling the wider world how it should help another community, without consulting that 
community first. There is a risk that I may misstep, but I wish to answer the call for White 
faculty to join faculty of Color in raising diversity and cultural literacy issues in the class-
room. For example, this express call was made in our discussions in the Community La-
wyering breakout group at the 2008 AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education in Tuc-
son, Arizona. My aim here is to write as an outsider to other outsiders about what the do-
minant society can do to open itself and embrace its place in the plurality. 
 145. Ford, supra note 4, at 1257-58 (emphasis added). 
 146. Cf. James M. Grijalva, Compared When? Teaching Indian Law in the Standard 
Curriculum, 82 N.D. L. REV. 697, 710-12 (2006) (addressing reader concerns that using In-
dian law materials may elicit a strong emotional response in some students, ranging from 
shame and guilt about the more egregious colonial policies like assimilation to xenophobia 
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cization148 of Native Americans is so entrenched in popular lore and 
memory that it seems to make what would otherwise be another in-
teresting layer of legal complexity into a near-archetypal encounter 
with the enigmatic “Other.”149 Add to this mix some understandable 
fears about stumbling into inadvertent racial and ethnic stereotypes 
or other offenses, and the anxiety level understandably increases. 
 Third, some scholars who advocate integrating federal Indian law 
across the curriculum have observed that the silence surrounding 
tribal law and nations stems from the fear that tribal legal matters 
require expertise in the field and are too inscrutable, or irrelevant, to 
address outside of specialty courses.150 Fortunately, there is no ap-
parent reason to treat Indian law differently from other complex top-
ics. For example, lawyers widely agree that both Family Law and 
Trusts and Estates courses should alert students to the importance 
of researching tax ramifications, even if tax otherwise exceeds the 
scope of the course and the professor’s expertise. As teachers, we can 
identify major intersections with federal Indian law, leaving the rest 
to more specialized courses or further research. 
 Furthermore, lawyers and law professors are trained as general-
ists, equipped with all the necessary skills to understand the essen-
tials of Indian law concepts like sovereignty, court structures, and 
custom-based reasoning. As law professors, the very core skill we 
model to our students is how to problem solve in a profession where 
the rules constantly change and every case is unique.  
 Finally, on a more mundane level, very few law professors have 
been exposed to federal Indian or tribal law in their own legal educa-
tion151 or in practice. Unless they specialize in the field or live in a 
                                                                                                                    
stemming from historical fears and resentments). See also Edwards & Vance, supra
note 101, at 74-75, which discusses teacher comfort levels when using cross-cultural writ-
ing assignments. 
 147. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th College ed. 1985) (defining anxiety as 
“1. A state of uneasiness and apprehension. 2. A state of apprehension, uncertainty, and 
fear resulting from the anticipation of a threatening event or situation.”). 
 148. WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 33-45 (tracing the history of Western notions of “In-
dian savagery”); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 61-63 (discussing “savagism in 
federal conceptions of Indians”). 
 149. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 2. See generally Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: 
Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75 (2003) (exploring how the archetype of the Indian as “oth-
er” forms one root of contemporary federal-tribal tensions). 
 150. Grijalva, supra note 146, at 699-713 (exploring pedagogical foundations for teach-
ing Indian law across the curriculum and responding to readers’ perceived obstacles re-
garding teacher preparedness and student frustration). 
 151. See Ford, supra note 4, at 1256; Grijalva, supra note 146, at 707 & n.79. Professor 
Grijalva suggests that most members of the legal academy and federal judiciary hail from 
the same set of elite law schools, which, at least in the past, have not devoted resources to 
Indian law. Id.; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 89-90. Contrast this with those 
law schools in the plains and western states, where the sense of closeness to Indian coun-
try is more strongly felt.  
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region with visible tribal activity in the mainstream, they may also 
fail to perceive the force with which tribal law and peoples continue 
to gain prominence in the dominant socio-legal system. Indian law’s 
practical relevance to our students is manifold because such prob-
lems are increasingly arising in mainstream law practice. This is not 
surprising, given Tribes’ broad land base and increasing economic 
development nationwide: 
Indian tribes occupy more than 55 million acres of reservation 
lands in 30 states. Reservation businesses generate $246 million  
in tax revenue annually for state and local governments, and  
$4.1 billion in annual tax revenue for the federal government. In 
2001, gaming tribes generated $13 billion in direct and indirect 
economic activity.152
Looking at the impact on just one state illustrates even better that 
ordinary practitioners increasingly need to understand and apply 
federal Indian and tribal law: 
Consider: 1) In 2002, Oregon’s eight gaming tribes generated $370 
million in revenue, contributing $8.5 million to local government 
and state non-profit groups; 2) Oregon tribes currently employ 
thousands of Indian and non-Indian employees. For example, the 
Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde employ 1,500 Oregonians, 
and the Cow Creek Band of the Umqua Tribe employs 1,200; 3) 
Oregon tribes occupy nearly one million acres of land in the State.153
As just one example of the impact of tribal economic development on 
the practice of transactional law, the same author notes the increas-
ing activity of Fortune 500 companies like Wal-Mart and AT&T in 
the development of tribal lands.154
 In conclusion, using tribal law as a comparative study better pre-
pares lawyers for practice because, among other things, there are 
many points of contact between tribal law and Anglo-American law 
within our federal system.155 As one author noted, ordinary practi-
tioners easily can encounter complicated tribal jurisdiction problems 
in child custody and adoption, probate, automobile accidents, enforc-
ing judgments, taxation, property development, and even run-of-the-
mill slip-and-fall cases, if they occur in a place like a tribal casino.156
 Because the benefits to our students are many and the costs to us 
as teachers are far fewer in comparison, we can and should give our 
students the basic framework to recognize that tribal and Indian law 
issues exist in practice. As we will see, the professor can choose how 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Galanda, Reservations of Right, supra note 11, at 66 (bullet points omitted). 
 153. Galanda, A Need to Know Indian Law, supra note 11, at 62.  
 154. Id.
 155. See Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 10, at 901. 
 156. Galanda, A Need to Know Indian Law, supra note 11, at 62. 
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far “down the rabbit hole” to go; the issue of primary and imperative 
importance is the proper representation of the three-sovereign sys-
tem, which can be addressed within the normal class time allotted to 
introduce the overall U.S. legal system. 
V.   THE INCENTIVES FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING
“[E]very society needs educated people, but the primary responsibility 
of educated people [is] to bring wisdom back into the community and 
make it available to others.”157
— Vine Deloria, Jr. 
 I have argued that it is necessary to teach the three-sovereign 
model of the U.S. federal system and to recognize the importance of 
indigenous law and legal systems as a matter of social, moral, histor-
ical, and academic imperative. Happily, there are also sound, strong 
teaching and learning incentives for doing so, and they are well 
grounded pedagogically in both the field of adult education called 
Transfer of Learning and in contemporary comparative law pedago-
gy. The next Section previews the desired learning outcomes for law 
professors and students. In the Sections that follow, the Article then 
provides the more detailed pedagogical and substantive knowledge 
required to begin teaching both the three-sovereign system and com-
parative studies in the law classroom. 
A.   Some Promising Teaching and Learning Outcomes 
 The incentives for teaching tribal governments and law through-
out law school, particularly during the first year, include a deeper 
understanding of fundamental systems and structures, better know-
ledge retention and skills transfer, increased cultural literacy, and 
heightened awareness of the role of culture in law and advocacy. 
 First, the broader, tri-governmental model better helps students 
to understand the fundamental relationships between multiple gov-
ernments, including such basic concepts as jurisdiction and choice of 
law. The simplest reason is that it is easier to understand dynamics 
when given more than one example. A strict state-federal study re-
veals only one major, binary jurisdictional relationship in isolation, 
and municipal examples cannot serve in the same role because they 
are so clearly subservient subdivisions without traces of residual na-
tional sovereignty. When tribal governments are added to the class-
room discussion, students gain two more governmental relationships 
                                                                                                                    
 157. Derrick Jensen, Where the Buffalo Go: How Science Ignores the Living World: An 
Interview with Vine Deloria, SUN MAG., July 2000, available at
http://www.derrickjensen.org/deloria.html.  
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for comparison and contrast, both tribal-federal and tribal-state. 
Once the class is ready to move beyond formalistic comparisons, re-
cognizing tribal sovereigns within the federal system shows, as no 
other example can, how the struggle for sovereignty is at the root of 
not only tribal—but also the state and federal—tug of war over pow-
er and resources. As we will continue to see below, these roots pre-
date the Constitution, formed the basis for many of its key elements, 
and continue to shape legal reality today. For example, studying the 
relationship between the United States, states, and Tribes in an or-
dinary first-year Civil Procedure class helps students to understand 
“general concepts of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction.”158
 Second, increasing the number of jurisdictional and cultural con-
texts for classroom examples increases the likelihood of transfer of 
learning to new contexts. “Transfer of Learning” is a field of study 
that encompasses many disciplines and is largely concerned with 
how students can generalize skills and knowledge for translation 
from the classroom to the professional world.159 Theorists have found 
that schematics, or “mental models,”160 foster transfer by encouraging 
students to perceive similarities between existing knowledge and 
new situations where that knowledge can be applied.161 Expanding 
our schema to include more examples of government, sovereignty, 
and jurisdiction increases the chances that law students will be able 
to transcend the traditional examples when they encounter novel 
problems in practice. 
 Moreover, when educators provide comparative examples for 
analogy and distinction, they increase the likelihood that students 
will also be able to cognitively “bridge” skills to new and more atte-
nuated contexts.162 Therefore, transfer theory lends support to the 
idea that introducing comparative tribal legal studies will lead stu-
dents to an increased ability to comprehend other areas of law. The 
sorts of skills that might be transferred from learning a three-
sovereign model might include such diverse abilities as understand-
ing intergovernmental jurisdictional tensions; the relevance of histor-
ical and social context in law and legal systems; the role of subtle 
sources of law, such as policy and social custom; the role of race and 
culture in legal discourse; and the ability to read and think more crit-
ically in all of these areas. 
                                                                                                                    
 158. Ford, supra note 4, at 1268. 
 159. See LEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 1. 
 160. Id.; see also ROBERT E. HASKELL, TRANSFER OF LEARNING: COGNITION,
INSTRUCTION AND REASONING 82-83 (Academic Press 2001). 
 161. See LEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 15. 
 162. See D.N. Perkins & Gavriel Salomon, Teaching for Transfer, EDUC. LEADERSHIP,
Sept. 1988, at 28-29 (1988) (arguing that using analogies helps students to transfer learn-
ing from one context to another and citing a cross-cultural analogy between slavery and 
apartheid as an example). 
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 Finally, comparative tribal legal studies can help train novice at-
torneys to see the law through a more culturally literate lens. As Pro-
fessor Weng notes, it should be axiomatic that increased cultural 
self-awareness is a crucial first step in multicultural lawyering train-
ing because “awareness of one’s own culture allows more accurate 
understanding of cultural forces that affect the lawyer, the client, 
and the interaction of the two.”163 Without respectful cross-cultural 
awareness, lawyers cannot adequately perform such fundamental 
tasks as counseling clients164 and developing case theory.165
B.   Pedagogical Foundations 
1.   Transfer of Learning 
 The field of Transfer of Learning studies how teaching techniques 
and curricular design can be used to help students apply skills 
learned in one context to a new context with varying degrees of at-
tenuation. Its leading theorists, Drs. David Perkins and Gavriel Sa-
lomon, argue that Transfer of Learning methodologies can help en-
hance critical reasoning, which arguably is the grand aim of higher 
education.166 In fact, the skills involved in learning about the third 
sovereign form a very comfortable fit with the characteristics of criti-
cal reflection identified by learning transfer theorists, which are the 
following: (1) “Questioning the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
communities”; (2) “Focusing on the social, political and historical na-
ture of the experience”; (3) “Considering power relations”; and (4) 
“Seeking emancipation.”167
 As for their model, Perkins and Solomon center their ideas around 
the simple proposition that the farther apart the two learning con-
texts, the more difficult it will be for students to apply what they 
learned earlier. The two ends of the spectrum are called “near” and 
“far” transfer. “Near” transfer occurs more easily. Perkins and Salo-
mon refer to this as a “low-road” transfer.168 One example might be 
learning to brief a torts case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
and then using that experience to brief a contracts case from the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court. Another might include examining the sove-
reign basis for general trial court jurisdiction in tribal court and us-
ing it to comprehend the sovereign basis for general trial court juris-
                                                                                                                    
 163. Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultur-
al Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 401 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 381-83. 
 165. Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 143, 152, 167-73 (1994). 
 166. See D.N. Perkins & Gavriel Salomon, Teaching for Transfer, 46 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 22, 23 (1988).  
 167. LEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 54. 
 168. Id. at 4-5. 
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diction in state courts, as well as the contrasting limited jurisdiction 
in the trial courts of the limited federal sovereign.169
 In contrast, “far” transfer requires a cognitive leap that takes 
much more conscious effort from the student, which is why it is 
sometimes called “high-road” transfer.170 There, an example might 
include studying the dynamics of colonial conquest in the field of fed-
eral Indian law and then, in one’s law practice, using that experience 
to consider the social and racial implications in U.S. immigration law 
when representing a Latina client applying for asylum. It might also 
include using a comparative example from indigenous law to under-
stand the “bundle of sticks” theory of American real property law and 
being able to later use that experience as an advocate to examine the 
relationship between a landlord and tenant in a complex lease-to-
own case. 
 In order to effectuate low- and high-road transfers, educators are 
asked to consider using techniques called “hugging” and “bridging,” 
respectively.171 While the details are beyond the scope of this work,172
the essence of the approach is to use “superficial stimulus” to trigger 
the otherwise automatic application of knowledge to near contexts 
and to bring a much greater effort to encouraging the “deliberate 
mindful” transfer of skills to far contexts.173 In some situations, 
teachers and students can use “forward-reaching” transfer to discuss 
in advance how skills will apply in future experiences and “back-
ward-reaching” transfer to identify how already-acquired skill sets 
can help to solve a current problem.174 The low-road/high-road model 
of learning transfer highlights why it is important to use ongoing di-
alogue to discuss not only the present relevance of the topic at hand, 
but also its relationship to past and future professional skills and 
situations. Even more, it shows that unless educators address key 
skills like critical thinking and cultural literacy across the curricu-
lum, such far transfer is not very likely to happen. Accordingly, while 
the core pedagogical basis for teaching the third sovereign and com-
parative tribal examples is probably found in comparative legal stu-
                                                                                                                    
 169. See infra Part VI.D (Selection of Authority and Path of Review) (discussing sove-
reignty as the basis for limited versus general jurisdiction among the trial courts of the 
three sovereigns).  
 170. See Perkins & Salomon, supra note 166, at 25-27. 
 171. See id. at 28-29. 
 172. Good general sources for legal education include David A. Binder & Paul Berg-
man, Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 191 (2003), and Mi-
chael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Theory and Instructional Design 
Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347 (2001). See also Tonya 
Kowalski, The Cartography of Legal Inquiry (NYLS Clinical Res. Inst. Paper No. 9/10 #6), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478997 (working paper). 
 173. Perkins & Salomon, supra note 166, at 25. 
 174. Id. at 26. 
798 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:765 
dies, it is the conscious use of transfer tools that makes enhanced 
learning a reality. 
2.   Comparative Legal Studies 
 Modern comparative tribal studies can be used to train novice at-
torneys to see the law through a more culturally literate lens. Al-
though comparative law has suffered understandable criticism as a 
tool for making positivist pronouncements about other cultures,175
the comparative study of legal systems is emerging with a new, more 
globally and culturally literate identity.176 Today, a better approach 
is to use comparison as a means to cultural self-awareness and as a 
mirror through which to understand and think critically about one’s 
own legal culture and institutions.177
 Not only is a comparative study helpful, it may also actually be 
necessary in order to properly introduce indigenous legal systems to 
our students in juxtaposition to the Anglo common-law tradition.178
Moreover, for any attorney who may one day practice in tribal courts 
or encounter federal Indian law issues, studying the Anglo common 
law tradition is only the beginning; he or she must also explore the 
other “points of convergence” with other domestic and international 
legal systems.179
 There are several very recent and promising examples of the use 
of comparative indigenous law in the general law curriculum. Profes-
sor Walter Otto Weyrauch of the University of Florida College of Law 
uses Roma180 tribal law as a comparative model to teach his students 
about private law by including sources often incorporated into public 
law, such as customary law.181 In his comparative law courses, he has 
found that “students [are] persistently more interested in tribal law 
than in the laws of western Europe.”182 In addition to Roma law, he 
has also uses studies of Inuit and African tribal law.183
                                                                                                                    
 175. Cf. Palmer, supra note 134, at 264-65 (describing the “postmodern critique,” which 
challenges comparativists to investigate the social context beyond the positive law). 
 176. Cf. WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 25-81 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006) (proposing a new 
approach to comparative law based on the globally conscious perspective, with an empha-
sis on plurality, culture, and respect for difference). 
 177. See Weng, supra note 163, at 382-83. 
 178. Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 10, at 901. 
 179. Id. (observing that both indigenous law students and those who wish later to 
serve indigenous communities must be well-schooled in both legal traditions in order to 
skillfully navigate the “intersections”). 
 180. Still popularly but perhaps pejoratively referred to as “Gypsy.” Weyrauch & Bell, 
supra note 133, at 334-35. 
 181. Id. at 332 n.20. 
 182. Id.
 183. Id.
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 Another convincing example of how to use indigenous law to  
contextualize U.S. law comes from a Property class at Drake Univer-
sity. Professor Jerry Anderson compares communal Hmong  
hunting rights with Wisconsin property law, which places a much 
greater emphasis on private ownership, in order to help students un-
derstand the “bundle of sticks” model for private property and how 
cultural approaches to property can affect certain “sticks,” such as 
the right to exclude.184 In yet another doctrinal subject, Professor 
Jack Williams of Georgia State University has observed that “[a] 
study of Indian commercial law in the traditional commercial law 
class provides a delightful portal into a better understanding of the 
Anglo-American commercial tradition.”185
 (a)   Avoiding a Positivist Framework 
 One common pitfall in comparative study is to lapse into the se-
ductive practice of positivism—using contrasts to pronounce which 
system is better, usually because it agrees with the scholar’s own 
personal or cultural value system.186 Another is to engage in “wishful 
thinking” in order to discover surface commonalities that cannot sur-
vive close scrutiny.187 This risk is particularly great when comparing 
indigenous systems with the purpose of locating a pan-indigenous 
law or culture, which leading scholars agree would undermine cul-
tural diversity and survival among Native peoples.188
 For these reasons and many others, critical legal theorists have 
challenged comparativists to go beyond that discipline’s positivist 
roots and to delve further into the social underpinnings of contempo-
                                                                                                                    
 184. Jerry L. Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: The Right to Ex-
clude, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 539, 544-45 (2006). 
 185. Jack F. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law into the Commercial Law and 
Bankruptcy Curriculum, 37 TULSA L. REV. 557, 565 (2001) [hereinafter Williams, Integrat-
ing American Indian Law].
 186. See Hill, supra note 134, at 107; see also MENSKI, supra note 176, at 150-60  
(criticizing the positivist fixation on formal structures and on the divorce of law from its 
moral context). 
 187. Hill, supra note 134, at 107. Professor Hill provides the example of the post-World 
War I movement in Europe to use comparative law to bolster a legal unification agenda, 
which supporters thought would help the cause of the League of Nations. Id. at 109. Mens-
ki observes that while comparativists should revisit the urge to identify syncretic elements 
in a simplistic way, the task of forging cross-cultural comparisons is so infinitely complex 
that it naturally entails some experimentation and even speculation. MENSKI, supra note 
176, at 67. 
 188. Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of 
Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1648 (2000) (“Self-determination for Native Ameri-
can people exists at the tribal level and not at a supratribal level as American Indians. 
American Indians acknowledge their historical and ancestral linkages through clans and 
migrations. But the oral histories and traditions of each specific tribe are quite particular 
and reside as sacred knowledge with members of that tribe.”). 
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rary legal systems189 in an effort to understand both the organic cul-
tural influences from the people who comprise the community, but 
also any “received” law190 such as systems imposed by colonial powers. 
 Professor Palmer contends that pragmatic, results-oriented ap-
proaches can be balanced with critical concerns about ethnocentrism 
by adopting a flexible methodology oriented toward the researcher’s 
goals.191 He identifies three types of comparativists, who each have 
different goals for their studies: the academic, the legislative refor-
mer, and the lawyer seeking applications to help resolve a particular 
legal problem.192 How much the researcher must balance the need for 
pragmatic results with the need to account for ethno-social context 
arguably depends on two primary factors: (1) the intended goal and 
audience for the study and the limitations of resources like time and 
money and (2) the availability of ethnographic evidence.193 According 
to Palmer, just as a mixed legal culture is possible194 when a commu-
nity creates a new legal culture from both original and received law, 
it is also possible to find a relative peace within the inherently imper-
fect effort to understand and compare another culture and its institu-
tions.195 Accordingly, using Palmer’s decisionmaking matrix, the 
teacher of any comparative study should first identify the goal and 
audience for the study and the availability of resources to provide 
ethnographic context. 
                                                                                                                    
 189. See Palmer, supra note 134, at 264-65. 
 190. See MASAJI CHIBA, ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW: IN INTERACTION WITH RECEIVED LAW
1-12 (1986) (Masaji Chiba ed., 1986); Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 10, at 
882-85 (describing the dialectic between received/imposed law from colonial and other out-
side sources and the emergence/resurgence of community-generated indigenous law); see 
also Aliza Organick & Sarah Sargent, Syllabus, Comparative Law: Understanding Method 
and Theory (Summer 2008) (on file with author; availability subject to permission from 
original authors). 
 191. See Palmer, supra note 134, at 289. 
192. Id.
 193. See id. at 288-90; cf. Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality 
and Separate Consciousness: [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, 1 
TRIBAL L.J. (2000), http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/ 
index.php (discussing the risks and rewards of decolonizing and reindigenizing tribal law, 
including the problems inherent in developing a hybrid system and in reducing to writing 
law that was intended to be maintained and transmitted in oral form). 
 194. Of course, whether a hybrid system is desirable is another matter beyond the 
scope of this Article. See generally Christine Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, 7 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 18 (1997) [hereinafter Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains]
(arguing that American Indian Nations should seek their own, indigenous solutions to in-
ternal legal problems). 
 195. See Palmer, supra note 134, at 276, 289. 
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(b)   Discerning Indigenous Laws and Institutions from Western or 
“Received” Examples 
 This Article proposes introducing students both to a new model of 
American federalism and to the study of law through comparative 
tribal and indigenous examples. What may feel confusing is that the 
two ideas sometimes intersect and sometimes do not. In other words, 
learning about law and systems through the three-sovereign lens is 
sometimes purely a study in Western law, sometimes purely a West-
ern/indigenous comparison, and more often a blend of the two. 
 The key is to understand that there is a broad spectrum of inte-
raction between indigenous and Western colonial law. On one end, a 
great deal of laws and systems are directly imposed on tribal com-
munities by the dominant society. In the middle, others are largely 
Western but are “received”196 by tribal communities and adopted 
with varying degrees of customization or even indigenization.197 The 
word “received” connotes that the laws or systems were adopted, al-
though there are arguably varying degrees of coercion involved in 
any such event. On the other end of the spectrum, a myriad of exam-
ples are deeply indigenous in that they represent a traditional ap-
proach preceding and surviving interaction with colonial constructs. 
For example, when we compare chthonic198 approaches to “property” 
with Western models, as in hunting and fishing rights cases, it is 
much more likely that we are very close to the “pure” comparative 
end of the spectrum of teaching possibilities because a chthonic indi-
genous approach predates and survives contact with Western peoples. 
 In contrast, when we discuss how federal policies have impacted 
Native peoples through assimilation, removal, and so on, we are 
more solidly within the Western paradigm in that the indigenous 
perspective obviously was not acknowledged or included (and indeed, 
was targeted for destruction). On that end of the spectrum, the teach-
ing value of the three-sovereign system has less to do with compara-
                                                                                                                    
 196. See CHIBA, supra note 190, at 7-9. In his introductory materials, Professor Chiba 
defines received law within the transnational context as “law which is received by a coun-
try from one or more foreign countries,” whether by choice or by force. Id. at 7. He also 
notes that whether indigenous and received law operate in relative harmony or in discord 
varies greatly from country to country. Id. at 8. 
 197. Native scholars and communities are also exploring how to decolonize their inter-
nal law. See Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, supra note 194, at 23 (“The chal-
lenge Indian nations face today is developing justice systems which are relevant to the 
people and which meet community needs, and most importantly do not unilaterally substi-
tute Western principles for indigenous concepts.”). 
 198. The term “chthonic” connotes a worldview with a fundamental orientation toward 
human relationships with each other, with nature, with the Earth, and with the very cos-
mos, differing greatly from the materialist perspective of many modern cultures. From a 
legal perspective, one of the most profound examples is the Western emphasis on individu-
al, rather than community property ownership. See Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy, supra
note 10, at 871. 
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tive study and more to do with raising awareness about this nation’s 
legal history. Many of the most useful examples will fall somewhere 
in the middle. When discussing customary law as a source of law, we 
can compare indigenous and Western forms of customary law as 
sources of law to analyze a legal problem, but students can also learn 
more about how the common law evolves by looking at how customa-
ry law is sometimes memorialized in a written, common law format 
in tribal courts that use many Western legal methods. 
 In some aspects, the three-sovereign federal model is by its very 
nature Western and colonial because it is the colonial mindset that 
places Indigenous peoples in a subordinate role. In other ways, it will 
always have an indigenous component because Indian nations are 
not mere political communities; they are also bound by culture, kin-
ship, and so on as aspects of their cultural sovereignty.199 Cultural 
sovereignty is inherent and cannot be defined, given, or taken away 
by outside forces. Of course, it is probably not easy to say that indi-
genous components are an acknowledged “part of” the three-
sovereign system because they have been so greatly attacked, ig-
nored, or marginalized by the national federal system. 
VI.   MAJOR APPLICATIONS IN THE LAW CURRICULUM
 This Section proposes three essential applications for comparative 
tribal legal studies. The first is to better understand the United 
States legal system. The second is to illuminate key legal analytical 
tools like sources of law and weight of authority. The third is to teach 
critical thinking, narrative reasoning, and cultural literacy. In all 
three situations, the audience consists of student attorneys in search 
of skills that will aid them in what we hope will be a thoughtful, so-
cially engaged, and aware law practice. 
A.   Cautionary Notes 
 In the early weeks of law school, it is a victory merely to inform 
students that American Indian nations exist as political entities200
                                                                                                                    
 199. See generally Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 15 (describing cultural sovereignty as an 
alternate basis for conceptualizing tribal sovereignty). 
 200. See Organick, supra note 9, at 858-59. 
In spite of the fact that Washburn has offered the seminar class on Native 
American law over the last several years, it has been an area of law that only 
few students have been exposed to. One of the first questions I ask my students 
in the first small group setting is, “Before coming to my class, did you know 
there was such a thing as a tribal court?” It is rare for even one hand to be 
raised. I follow that question with, “How many of you know how many tribes 
reside in the state of Kansas?” Since I came to [Washburn] in the fall of 2004, 
not one student has been able to answer that question correctly. I emphatically 
contend that this is not their fault. Before the State of New Mexico required 
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and have sovereignty. And yet, as discussed earlier, the topic never 
can be divorced from its historical and cultural context. So far, the 
way I address this tension is always to caution the students—both in 
our class discussions and in caveats on my handouts and diagrams—
that the cultural and legal representations are necessarily simplistic 
because the topic is far too complex for the scope of the course. It is 
important to stress the rights of indigenous communities to streng-
then their own traditions, even when those values clash with West-
ern values. In a study of government systems, this topic might arise 
when explaining that Tribes have rich diversity in their structures 
and that they do not necessarily follow the three-branch model with 
separation of powers.201 When comparing sources of law, which can 
include both Western customary law and indigenous custom and tra-
dition, teachers need to provide some ethnographic context for the 
communities involved in the problem.202 Although this may sound dif-
ficult at first, there are good examples from tribal court decisions 
that take the time to explain the use of customary evidence.203
 In addition to the need for contextualization, it is also important 
to know that even a very brief layperson’s overview of tribal sove-
reignty is probably always going to be a provocative—or at least sur-
prising—topic for the uninitiated, another byproduct of the ostraciza-
tion of indigenous history and issues in American education. Like 
slavery, the history of tribal sovereignty raises deep questions about 
the United States’ colonial past and the role of all three branches of 
government in the process. In particular, confronting the kind of 
ethnic and cultural genocide described earlier can be shocking for 
younger minds, who usually have been taught the more positive as-
pects of American history, and can even result in a degree of denial. 
Ultimately, this difficult transition is a valuable step toward develop-
ing a more critical and holistic view of the law and its role in the 
larger concept of “justice.” Based on Professor Ford’s long experience 
in integrating federal Indian law into Civil Procedure, it is best to ar-
                                                                                                                    
that federal Indian law be tested on the state bar exam, I’m not sure how many 
UNM students could have answered that same question correctly. As a result of 
the lack of federal Indian law or tribal law in the broader curriculum, students 
do not realize how many ways, as practitioners in Kansas, they will need to 
have a basic understanding of federal Indian law and how to practice in a tribal 
court. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 201. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty In-
dian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 347 & n.252 (1998) (noting the tensions be-
tween Western lawmakers and the need for tribal diversity in sovereign governance). 
 202. Calleros, Exploring Racial Context, supra note 137, at 281, 284. 
 203. One such example is the Yakima wedding trade case discussed below. See infra 
Part VI.C (Sources of Law and Forms of Reasoning). 
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ticulate from the beginning of the term why she includes that ma-
terial in the course.204
 In my legal analysis course, I sometimes begin by laying out the 
statistics showing the increasing economic impact that Tribes have 
on the federal and state economies, the fact that almost any legal 
topic can intersect with Indian law, and some real or hypothetical 
examples of situations where “ordinary” state and federal law practi-
tioners will likely encounter Native clients or Indian and tribal law 
issues. I have also grown into discussing the underlying socio-ethno-
historical-political context and am still learning how to do so effec-
tively and efficiently. 
 Finally, because modern tribal sovereignty is still in grave danger 
from aggressive federal205 and state206 governments, newcomers to 
the field, including our students, need to understand that Native 
American nations must proceed with caution in testing the bounds of 
their ability to exercise otherwise sovereign powers. This under-
standing can aid a student’s introduction to the need to take caution 
when dealing with clients from other cultures, as lawyers from out-
side the client’s culture and society sometimes can do more harm 
than good when presuming to act in their best interests.207
                                                                                                                    
 204. Ford, supra note 4, at 1268-69. 
 205. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, supra note 62, at 587-93 
(arguing that the Supreme Court tends to adopt doctrines designed to carry out federal pol-
icies hostile to tribal sovereignty). 
 206. See CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at xv, 4 (describing how the modern 
practice of “(d)evolving” certain federal trust responsibilities to states forces Native nations 
to negotiate with them for many of their sovereign rights and also arguing that state lead-
ers tend not to act in “good faith” when attacking Native nations’ rights to govern their 
own affairs and territories). 
 207. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 119, at 155. Professor Strickland 
provides one particularly vivid and devastating example of the perils of cultural illiteracy 
in legal practice and scholarship: 
The first president of the Association of American Law Schools, James Bradley 
Thayer, whom we know as a major figure in evidence and constitutional law, 
was also the leader of a group known as “Friends of the Indians.” All of us know 
the results of the Friends of the Indians. I did an article, more years ago than 
the one Gloria quoted, in which I said, “With such friends, who needs enemies?” 
This was a kind of approach in and out of the academy that said, “We know 
what is best for the Indian.” And it led to the adoption of the most disastrous 
allotment programs in history of Indian relations. Angie Debo and Father 
Francis Paul Prucha went back and looked at this era in their work. They dis-
covered that the Indians were saying all of the disastrous things that have 
happened would happen if these programs were adopted. Apologists for the 
“Friends of the Indians” asked how they could have known that allotment 
would not work. Well, they could have listened. In my own research I located 
more than 100 petitions and protests written by Indians and Indian tribes 
which were submitted to the Congress and the Friends of the Indians that said 
these programs would not work. This was a period in which the academy was a 
patronizing friend to the native warrior. 
Id.
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B.  Teaching the Three-Sovereign Model as an Introduction  
to the U.S. Legal System208
 Using federal Indian law as a comparative teaching tool is espe-
cially useful in the areas of federal intergovernmental structural re-
lationships and court systems.209 The pedagogy Section above dis-
cussed how adding additional interjurisdictional relationships to the 
federal model enhances learning. There is an even deeper reason 
that can lead to a more profound understanding of these relation-
ships: it is each of the three government’s sovereignty (or vestiges 
thereof) that forms the fundamental basis for their borders, jurisdic-
tion, drive for ethnic, community, or national self-determination, and 
so on. tribal examples make this dynamic feel real and current: sove-
reignty is of such vital importance to the survival of Native nations 
that it provides the richest comparative study with which to sift out 
what sovereignty means to different players in the federal system 
and to how the “game” is played. 
 Legal writing210 professors and law school orientation curriculum 
designers are well poised to shape students’ early impressions of how 
Indian nations, citizens, and their laws “rate” within the U.S. federal 
system.211 Because the most explicit, discrete discussions of the legal 
system take place in orientation programs and legal writing class-
rooms during the first semester, this Section will speak primarily to 
creating those kinds of introductory modules.212 Earlier, we discussed 
                                                                                                                    
 208. Local government is omitted here because it does not enjoy all of the historical 
hallmarks of sovereignty discussed here (e.g., the innate right of a people to determine 
their own society, governance, and destiny). While it is true that municipalities share some 
features such as community self-governance and, in many matters, the threat of 
state/federal supremacy or hegemony, we do not usually think of municipalities as enjoying 
the same type of internationally recognized “statehood” as did colonies during the Colonial 
period and Tribes during the Treaty period. 
 209. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law, supra note 185, at 567 (describing 
the field’s usefulness in teaching “sovereignty and the judicial and adjudicatory process”). 
 210. “Legal writing” is used interchangeably here with other descriptors for the sake of 
variety. The course name “Legal Method” is sometimes adopted to summarize all the com-
ponents of a classic one-year legal writing curriculum, including analysis, research, writ-
ing, and sometimes clinical skills like client interviewing, counseling, and dispute resolu-
tion. It is probably a more complete and accurate descriptor than the customary moniker, 
“legal writing.” Cf. Roy M. Mersky, Legal Research Versus Legal Writing Within the Law 
School Curriculum, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 395, 396 (2007) (“Legal writing instructors have been 
forced to embrace legal research, legal writing, remedial writing, basic writing, grammar, 
legal method, advocacy, counseling, and a whole smorgasbord of other activities.”). 
 211. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 104-11 (noting the crucial role that legal 
writing courses play in bridging the theory/practice divide and describing how innovations 
like scaffolding, modeling, peer feedback, and contextual learning have transformed the 
pedagogy of written legal analysis). Law librarians also deserve praise for helping to build 
interest in Indian law in legal education. See Strickland & Valencia-Weber, supra note 
119, at 157. 
 212. Because the applications presented here are designed to illuminate existing curri-
culum topics and not to add to them, bridging the indigenous law gap need not overburden 
an already bursting first-year legal writing curriculum or faculty. 
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the roots of the modern tribal-federal relationship as based on the co-
lonial doctrine of discovery. To complete a basic understanding of a 
three-sovereign framework, it is also necessary to consider the rela-
tionship between the state and federal governments so that it can be 
cautiously compared to the tribal-federal dynamic.213 I argue that the 
state-federal relationship is based on the tension between the origi-
nal colonial sovereigns, the states, and the ostensibly limited nation-
al sovereign that they created and invested with some of their innate 
powers—and that while the tribal-federal relationship has different 
roots, Tribal nations share some important features of a primordial, 
original sovereign as they relate to legal systems. After examining 
the state-federal dynamic, this Section addresses how to teach this 
model in the classroom setting. 
1.   State and Federal Sovereignty from the Western Perspective 
 During the Revolutionary War, the prevailing philosophy, epito-
mized by Locke and enshrined in the Constitution, was that the pow-
er to govern comes from the people themselves and that the govern-
ment serves at their will.214 This conception differed greatly from Eu-
ropean ideas of sovereignty, which by this time had succumbed to the 
political philosophy of the Divine Right of Kings. This doctrine, which 
developed from the ruling elite’s opposition to the populist revolu-
tions of the age, posits that the source of all political sovereignty 
vested in God, rather than in the people.215
 Despite the colonists’ desire for a federal form of government, 
their experiences in Europe taught them that local control often  
is less prone to abuses of power. Thus the states determined to  
retain many important aspects of their original sovereignty, while 
ceding others to the new, national sovereign.216 Therefore, when the 
states ratified the Federal Constitution, they intended to create a 
federal government with limited powers.217 When they joined the Un-
                                                                                                                    
 213. There is also an uneasy, complicated, and perhaps even more historically hostile 
relationship between states and Tribes that goes beyond the scope of this Article. See gen-
erally CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5 (analyzing the roots of historical state-tribal 
tensions in cultural and racial bias); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Ene-
mies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007) (advocating for state and 
Tribes to enter into a new period of increased cooperation); Aliza Organick & Tonya Ko-
walski, From Conflict to Cooperation: State and Tribal Court Relations in the Era of Self-
Determination, 45 COURT REV. 48 (2009) (arguing that it is in the states’ interests to forge 
more cooperative relationships with Native nations). 
 214. MERRIAM, supra note 45, at 159 n.1. 
 215. See id. at 52-62. 
 216. See id. at 160-61. 
 217. See id. at 162 (“The [C]onstitution does not abolish altogether the [s]tate govern-
ments; it makes them ‘constituent parts of the national sovereignty’ and leaves them in 
possession of ‘certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.’ ” (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton))). States were to “ ‘retain all the rights of so-
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ion, new states retained remaining aspects of the greater sovereign 
whole.218 As a result of this new world brand of “divisible sovereign-
ty,”219 states ostensibly have all general sovereign powers not ceded 
to the federal government, and in many respects their courts behave 
like courts of general jurisdiction, not strictly limited like their fed-
eral counterparts.220
 Merriam traces the evolution of American-style sovereignty after 
this period, when it began to take on a more nationalistic flavor in 
order to survive the conflict with the South during the Civil War.221
Merriam argues that since then, sovereignty cannot reasonably  
be divided and truly rests not in the states or in their individual  
citizens, but in American society as a whole.222 Perhaps this change 
in philosophy, which seems to have occurred during the Spring  
of Nations, is the reason we see such a strong centralized  
government today despite its foundation in the notion of a divided, 
popular sovereignty. 
 From a Western and international law perspective, modern sove-
reignty since the seventeenth century has several traditional hall-
marks, all of which now are being challenged by globalization. In ad-
dition to control by a single political authority, “[s]overeign states 
have four characteristics, three of which are negotiable: territory, 
population, a government with control over the territory and popula-
tion, and international recognition. In practice, only international 
recognition is non-negotiable.”223 Scholars contend that modern sove-
reignty is now being forced to bend under pressure from changing in-
ternational political philosophies. For example, the international 
community increasingly recognizes the right to intervene in human 
rights catastrophes. Further, globalization permeates borders with 
open markets, plural societies, and rapidly evolving technology.224
                                                                                                                    
vereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to 
the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 218. Id. at 163.
 219. See id. (noting that the idea of a divided sovereignty between the nation and its 
member states was early acknowledged by the Supreme Court, most clearly in Chisolm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1793)). 
 220. In the sense that the states and federal government can be considered one, di-
vided sovereign instead of two, the “three-sovereign system” may be a misnomer, but it is 
probably still a helpful one for students because in practicality, they still are working with 
three very distinct types of governments. See O’Connor, supra note 118. 
 221. MERRIAM, supra note 45, at 171-80. 
 222. See id. at 180-82. 
 223. MARYANN CUSIMANO LOVE, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL AGENDA 
3 (2d ed. 2003). 
 224. See id. at 14-15. 
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2.   Teaching the Three-Sovereign Model 
 Tribal communities in the United States have a unique kind of po-
litical sovereignty, with some parallels to the state/federal sovereign 
but also with many fascinating distinctions.225 While they do not en-
joy the modern, international model of sovereignty as a separate 
state, they possess many integral aspects of nationhood that remain 
very important in advocating for their political right to exist as 
peoples.226 Thus, teaching the federal system to law students goes 
beyond high-school level civics lessons about the three branches of 
government and separation of powers. Instead, while there is some 
basic review on concepts like the separation of powers, the emphasis 
lies on the interplay between government structures and the court 
systems in the new context of the litigation process.227 Teaching these 
topics within the conceptual framework of sovereignty228 helps to ex-
plain why there are separate governments and court systems and 
when the path of appellate review must cross from one sovereign’s 
courts to another. It can also show how the struggle for self-
determination creates these boundaries. 
 Before going further into the benefits of comparing the relation-
ship between states, Tribes, and the federal government, please note 
that narrower attempts to compare states and Tribes are fraught 
with pitfalls but that explaining them to students is part of what 
makes the three-government model so instructive. While it is fair to 
invoke the state/tribal comparison in some situations, it also falls 
apart in others and can even cause harm to Tribal peoples. While 
Tribes have inherent sovereignty as peoples and the historical evi-
dence to claim a sovereignty closer to modern statehood, the reality is 
that their political sovereignty has been usurped over time by Con-
gress and the Supreme Court. Thus, while it is commonly agreed 
among Indian law scholars229 and Native American nations230 that 
                                                                                                                    
 225. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 122, at 241-303 (providing a big-picture 
overview of the evolving nature of tribal sovereignty today). 
 226. See Robert Odawi Porter, Conceptions of Indigenous Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY,
COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS: A READER 3 (Robert Odawi Porter ed., 2005). 
 227. See, e.g., CALLEROS, supra note 129, at 13-26 (teaching the legal system in terms 
of the three branches as sources of law and in terms of court structures as paths of review); 
LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS 13-28 (2003) (same); RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE
3-14 (5th ed. 2005) (same). 
 228. By suggesting that sovereignty is the most helpful organizing principle in this ear-
ly stage of legal education does not mean that I condone the positivist view that the law it-
self is a product of sovereign will and not the natural law of the people. See ANGHIE, supra
note 27, at 40-52 (contrasting naturalist, humanist, and positivist jurisprudence). 
 229. See Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judi-
cial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 
Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 393 (1995). 
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those nations ideally should be considered distinct peoples with the 
right to self-determination under international law,231 it is also un-
derstood that the power to exercise that sovereignty does not exist at 
this time in its rightful form. Instead, it is severely constricted by a 
confusing and inconsistent maze of statutes, regulations, and judicial 
doctrines developed during disparate periods of colonial history.232
Accordingly, Professor Goldberg warns that while the state compari-
son is often used by Indian law professors to demonstrate that Tribes 
should share similar sovereign powers, it has been used detrimental-
ly by the Supreme Court to impose the doctrine of federal plenary 
power over Indian Tribes.233
 Fortunately, we do not need to make harmful generalizations in 
order to use the three-sovereign model as a teaching tool. Comparing 
states and Tribes helps students to understand general versus li-
mited powers by identifying a very broad pattern: those sovereigns 
that have general, residual powers (no matter how eroded in modern 
times) are those that “came before.” We see this idea expressed con-
sistently among such varied groups from “states’ rights” proponents 
to members of indigenous communities. The fundamental premise is 
that of a community’s right to self-determination, which forms one of 
the core principles of contemporary international law,234 even in the 
face of globalization. 
 Of those governments with innate sovereignty—the Tribes in par-
ticular and also the states—we see the tendency toward retained 
powers such as the creations of government, including courts, as well 
as general jurisdiction in the courts as compared to the federal gov-
ernment, although some troubling dicta from the Supreme Court 
suggests that tribal courts’ freedom to assert their rightful general 
jurisdiction is under threat.235 Just as the original colonial sove-
                                                                                                                    
 230. This Article does not address the unique situation of Alaskan Native communi-
ties, which more often have a corporate-style structure imposed upon them, see CLINTON ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 143, or Hawaiian peoples, who are still debating whether obtaining 
federal recognition and domestic dependent nation status would serve them or harm them. 
See generally David Keanu Sai, A Slippery Path Towards Hawaiian Indigeneity: An Analy-
sis and Comparison Between Hawaiian State Sovereignty and Hawaiian Indigeneity and 
Its Use and Practice in Hawai’i Today, 10 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 68 (2008) (examining 
the recent movement toward Hawaiian “tribal” sovereignty as problematic, given Hawai’i’s 
internationally recognized sovereign status as late as the 1840s). 
 231. See, e.g., WILKINS, supra note 28, at 25-27. 
 232. See generally id. (exploring the various historical Supreme Court doctrines in fed-
eral Indian law as “masks” for furthering federal antitribal initiatives over the years). 
 233. Carole Goldberg, Critique by Comparison in Federal Indian Law, 82 N.D. L. REV.
719, 727-35 (2006). 
 234. ANGHIE, supra note 27, at 35, 196 (explaining that the United Nations adopted 
the doctrine of self-determination to aid the process of decolonization beginning in the 
1960s and 1970s). 
 235. The notion of tribal courts as courts of general jurisdiction was criticized by Jus-
tice Scalia’s majority opinion for Nevada v. Hicks, a case denying tribal court jurisdiction 
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reigns, the states, have the right to establish their own court systems 
in the manner they see fit, Tribal nations have the power to create 
their own courts by an internal legislative act or by constitution. A 
small number of Tribal nations also choose not to adopt a law and 
order code or a traditional model and instead use the late nineteenth 
century federal model called the Courts of Indian Offenses.236 In con-
trast, the federal government is limited in its judicial design by  
the Constitution.  
 To make the contrast even more vivid, students are often sur-
prised to learn that Native American nations also have the power not
to create a Western-style court system, sometimes choosing instead 
to keep traditional dispute resolution systems outside of the modern 
government structure or even to revitalize traditional methods as an 
alternative to (or improvement upon) models preferred by the domi-
nant society.237 This freedom enhances any discussion of modern so-
vereignty and self-determination by showing the primacy of the 
people themselves in creating their own governing structures.238 The 
healthy diversity in tribal examples also provides a unique and more 
historically accurate jumping-off point for introducing other justice 
models, such as modern American forms of alternative dispute reso-
lution, which have some origins in Native North American societies.239
 To summarize, when students understand the fundamental dif-
ferences between different types of sovereigns, the reasons why judi-
cial models may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is not so diffi-
cult for students to grasp—those that “came before” have much more 
power to creatively design solutions that work for their people. Those 
that are created by other sovereigns may be more constrained. More-
over, students can take note of the role of a constitution in establish-
ing the framework in the state and federal systems versus those Tri-
                                                                                                                    
when Nevada officers completed a search on Fallon Paiute-Shoshone reservation trust 
lands. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 & n.8 (2001). Nevertheless, the Court’s discus-
sion of tribal general jurisdiction, which appears to be dicta, focused on legislative restric-
tion on tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers and concluded that when jurisdiction 
is restricted in certain areas, it cannot be general. Id. The Court’s discussion does not take 
into account tribal courts’ inherent jurisdiction over general tribal matters that have not 
been legislated away, which has much more in common with state jurisdiction (which, by 
the way, also has many areas legislated away by federal law) than with federal jurisdic-
tion. See id.
 236. Courts of Indian Offenses were created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and en-
shrined in the Code of Federal Regulations in order to enforce a Code of Indian Offenses, 
which originally attacked many traditional ways of life. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 
340. The tribes that use CFR/COI Courts are listed at 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(a) (2009). 
 237. Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, supra note 194, at 18-19. 
 238. Cf. id. at 18 (arguing that by virtue of their inherent sovereignty, Indigenous 
peoples have the power to design their own systems of law and government consistent with 
their cultural values). 
 239. JEROME T. BARRETT & JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 43-44 (2004).  
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bes that, whether by outside influence or as an exercise of self-
determination, chose not to use a constitutional model. 
 It is not critical for the instructor to immediately understand all of 
the details about different types of tribal legal models and their ori-
gins in the complex history of federal regulation, including the often 
surprising information that not all tribal governments use a separa-
tion of powers model.240 The key point is that nations, whether feder-
al, state, indigenous, or another nation-state, should enjoy the power 
to choose for themselves. Gaps in understanding can actually serve 
enculturation into the profession by demonstrating that lawyers are 
not expected to be experts in most legal topics, only in the skills 
needed to solve problems and to advocate. 
C.   Sources of Law and Forms of Reasoning 
 Because students traditionally are indoctrinated with case law 
theory in their other first-year courses, they often develop a skewed 
perspective of which law controls a given problem. Understandably, 
they draw the inference that the study of precedent is more impor-
tant than statutes, regulations, and other authorities. In fact, first-
term law students barely register those other forms on their radars, 
particularly such overlooked forms as customary reasoning. Thus the 
casebook method inadvertently trains students habitually to overlook 
binding authorities: 
Although training in legal research and writing is an accepted part 
of the first-year curriculum, few students learn transnational legal 
research in their first year. Nor do they learn alternative concep-
tions of source material. The “provincial” overemphasis on deci-
sional law at the expense of statutes and scholarship has been ex-
tensively critiqued over the decades in these pages and elsewhere. 
To build on this critique, one might repeat that methodological 
provincialism can fail a lawyer who would do better as an advo-
cate, a few years later, with the help of these alternative routes to 
a favorable outcome.241
 Many professors who teach legal methods courses are working to 
bridge the gap by introducing statutes and regulations earlier in the 
first-year curriculum. Once again, domestic comparative study pro-
vides a basis for a more intuitive understanding of the all the differ-
ent sources of applicable law. By teaching to the three-sovereign 
model, one single comparative system provides every kind of primary 
law source under one roof. Not only do Native American nations have 
                                                                                                                    
 240. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 360-61. 
 241. Bernstein, supra note 98, at 585-86 (citations omitted). 
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their own constitutions, codes, regulations and case law,242 they are 
also governed or impacted by federal and state laws and regulations 
and are parties to international agreements in the form of treaties 
with the federal government.  
 The tribal example also provides a fascinating window into the 
very creation of law and legal institutions. As Professor Blumenfeld 
notes, opening the world of tribal court decisions to law students 
highlights the importance of a community’s right to self-
determination and its need for law that meets local priorities and 
values. This approach “can lead to an interesting and eye-opening 
comparative analysis of some fundamental principles of legal method 
that we commonly teach in a more limited way in a legal writing 
class.”243 For example, although a number of tribal communities have 
comprehensive, Western-style written codes,244 many others are in an 
explosively creative period of code writing. Many others may have 
chosen not to commit too many societal rules to writing and instead 
rely upon oral tradition to form their body of law. Still others may 
adopt a hybrid system by choice or by the necessity of dealing with a 
society fractured between assimilated members and traditional 
members, for lack of better terms.245 As with all things indigenous, 
the diversity is too rich to constrict to Westernized models. 
 Perhaps the most vivid example supplied by a comparative study 
of sources of law is customary law, a pervasive but typically over-
looked form of law and reasoning in the Anglo system. In her popular 
text, Linda Edwards identifies several types of legal reasoning com-
monly used by lawyers, depending on the source of law around which 
the reasoning revolves: rule, case analogy, policy, social principle, so-
cial custom, and narrative.246 Forms like principle, custom, and narr-
ative are less often discussed or even recognized in law school or 
                                                                                                                    
 242. Any generalization about tribal structures or culture is always a gross generaliza-
tion subject to myriad exceptions. I have tried to limit my use of generalizations or to ex-
plain them, but the amount of detail required to do so with scholarly precision would vastly 
exceed the scope of this Article and may not even ultimately be achievable from a cross-
cultural standpoint. 
 243. Calleros, Exploring Racial Context, supra note 137, at 285. 
 244. See, e.g., Tribal Law & Policy Institute, Tribal Court Clearinghouse: Tribal 
Laws/Codes, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/codes.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 245. See Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, supra note 194, at 19-22. 
 246. EDWARDS, supra note 227, at 55-62. According to Edwards, rule-based reasoning 
argues for an outcome based on a binding legal provision, such as a statute or judicial hold-
ing, id. at 55-56; analogical reasoning contends that a matter should be resolved based on 
how it compares to the facts and holding in other cases, id. at 56-58; policy-based reasoning 
influences the decisionmaker that the proposed outcome is the better one for societal inter-
ests (e.g., the economy), id. at 58-59; principle-based reasoning invokes equitable concerns 
like “morality, justice, fair-play, equality, democracy, or personal freedom,” id. at 59; cus-
tom-based reasoning sounds in cultural behavioral norms, id. at 59-60; and narrative rea-
soning uses time-honored storytelling techniques to compel the reader to intuit the “right” 
result, id. at 60-62. 
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practice, so they can be difficult for students to grasp. Once again, 
tribal law provides a helpful comparative domestic system for under-
standing the outer boundaries and uses of customary law. 
 Customary law, as distinguished from international customary 
law, is defined by socially understood, uncodified behavioral norms.247
In modern jurisprudence, customary law typically comes into play in 
interpreting U.S. constitutional law,248 in creating international 
law,249 or in filling in gaps in the domestic law where statutory and 
common law have not yet spoken. By their very definition, customary 
rules have a long history of adoption and practice by the wider com-
munity. From a legal standpoint, “[s]uch norms become law as a re-
sult of uniform practice or acceptance and, at least theoretically, be-
come law even before an authoritative or juridical body has an oppor-
tunity to assess their status as law.”250
 For example, a jurisdiction without codified traffic rules might re-
ly on customary rules for behavior at four-way intersections in a law-
suit between actors in an automobile collision.251 In the Edwards text, 
the author provides the example of a minor who buys a used car and 
later seeks to avoid the contract. In the absence of a clear statute or 
common law rule, the court might adopt as the law of the case a cus-
tomary rule that adults do not engage in arms-length bargains with 
minors, but rather with their parents or guardians.252
 Lawyers and law professors alike often underestimate the role of 
customary law in Western society, as well as its importance to every-
day legal decisions—and thus to law practice. As Professors Wey-
rauch and Bell describe, customary law rarely is expressly cited in 
any Western opinion, but is used often, usually to correct the unpa-
latable results that come from a forced and legalistic application of 
settled law.253 The court may use flexible legal tools like the abuse of 
discretion standard or canons of construction to inject the more hu-
mane, common-sense expectations of the community into the result. 
This process takes place on a relatively instinctive level: “Appellate 
judges may not even be aware that this is their source of law.”254
 These examples seem clear enough, but today, prolific codification 
and pervasive electronic access to both published and unpublished 
                                                                                                                    
 247. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 71 (1968). 
 248. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Juri-
sprudence, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 61-62 (2007) [hereainafter Fletcher, Rethinking Cus-
tomary Law].
 249. E.g., Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Forma-
tion, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 127 (2007). 
 250. Id.
 251. Id.
 252. EDWARDS, supra note 227, at 60. 
 253. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 133, at 330. 
 254. Id.
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case law make it difficult to convince students that they ever will 
need to understand or apply customary law. Tribal law provides a 
fascinating modern example of customary law in frequent use. By 
teaching customary law, our students can learn to read case deci-
sions and other primary sources more critically. 
 In my class, I sometimes supplement textbook readings on legal 
reasoning with a customary law exercise borrowed from Justin Rich-
land and Sarah Deer’s college-level textbook, Introduction to Tribal 
Legal Studies.255 There, the authors use a succinct judicial opinion 
from the Yakima Nation Tribal Court about a traditional Yakima 
Nation wedding. The exercise is intended to illustrate how both writ-
ten rules and indigenous “custom and tradition”256 are used as forms 
of legal reasoning to decide modern cases—even where the nation’s 
written code already has spoken.  
 In Marriage of Napyer, the Yakima Nation Tribal Court validated 
the traditional marriage of Helen Sohappy Napyer and Louis Napy-
er, Sr., finding that the couple’s family representatives completed the 
recognized components of a Yakima wedding trade, including the ex-
change of traditional suitcases, clothing, meals, dishes, and roots.257
The customary law was proved through the testimony of a recognized 
tribal elder.258 A code provision allowed the court to elect to apply 
customary law in place of a conflicting tribal statute on the validity 
of marriages.259
 In one class, I asked my students to reflect on the following ques-
tions about sources of law in the Napyer case and to write a succinct 
paragraph in response: 
The tribal court found sources of applicable law in the tribal code 
and in tribal custom and tradition. How did the court go about de-
termining the nature of the customary law? Why did the court fa-
vor custom as the governing law in this case? From what source of 
law did the court derive its authority to choose customary law over 
                                                                                                                    
 255. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 46, at 302-03. The usefulness of this case to 
teach customary law also was noted in passing by Professor Jack Williams of Georgia State 
University College of Law, who uses other tribal court cases to reveal the role of customary 
law in Anglo-American commercial law. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law, su-
pra note 185, at 568 & n.81. 
 256. In tribal law, tradition is distinguished from custom. While custom is a set of long-
held behaviors or practices recognized and practiced by a community, tradition refers more 
specifically to dispute resolution methods and methods for transmitting the law from gen-
eration to generation, often orally. Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, supra note 
194, at 22-23. 
 257. In re the Marriage of Napyer, 19 INDIAN L. REV. 6078, 6078 (1992). 
 258. Id.
 259. Some tribal codes prefer customary law to codified law while others prohibit its 
use. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law, supra note 248, at 65. Still others may leave the 
source of law to judicial discretion. 
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codified law? In a future case, could the same court use the Napyer
decision as a source of law? What kind of law would it be?260
Most of the students, now in their third week of law school counting 
orientation, ably described that the customary law came from the 
testimony of a tribal elder. This led to an interesting discussion 
about how not all sources are written, even in modern Western juri-
sprudence. Some are oral, such as in this tribal court example; others 
are understood implicitly among members of society and may be 
proved by historical example or even by a sort of judicial notice. 
 In the third question, students then were challenged to explore 
the interplay between sources. Almost all identified the Code as the 
source of the very authority that the court later used to contradict it. 
The last question was designed to see if students could identify the 
case decision as a source of law itself. 
 In hindsight, it might be even more productive to work in still 
more examples of legal reasoning from the Edwards book.261 For ex-
ample, there was a clear line of reasoning by the principle at play 
when the court made an implicit determination that customary law 
is inherently superior to rule-based law because it promotes the cul-
tural continuity of the people. Moreover, policy reasoning arguably 
also was at work in that the court questioned in dicta whether the 
code provision could be enforced when it violated federal statutes. 
 This question could have been made better and less directive,  
allowing the students to make more of the connections on their own, 
by instead informing the students that they were being challenged  
to detect different forms of legal reasoning at work in the opinion  
and asking them to name one example of each. This was the first 
year that I assigned a written exercise based on the reading and was  
uncertain about whether students would be distracted by the tribal 
law aspect. But placing the discussion in a legal context different 
from—but relevant to—the state/federal paradigm actually seemed 
to make the subject more exciting, which anecdotally confirms Pro-
fessor Weyrauch’s observation.262
 To conclude, our class could have explored the intersections be-
tween customary and other types of reasoning in an Anglo-American 
case, but the epiphany that several types of legal reasoning can take 
place in the same opinion probably would not have been as interest-
ing. The new context and comparative example gave the material a 
fresh feeling. 
                                                                                                                    
 260. On file with author. 
 261. See EDWARDS, supra note 227, at 55-62 (identifying the six different types of legal 
reasoning discussed near the beginning of this Section).  
 262. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 133 (observing that students are often more sti-
mulated by tribal comparative law than by Western comparative examples). 
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 In the coming years, I plan to add an extra step because I fear 
that leaving the exercise solely in the tribal context may unduly ex-
oticize the material for newer law students; they may come away 
thinking that customary reasoning really only takes place in the tri-
bal context and is not something they really will have to worry about 
much at all in practice. I plan now to ask the students to identify the 
types of reasoning in two cases, one Anglo and one tribal. The Anglo 
case will contain at least one arguable example of customary reason-
ing. By studying the two cases together, the exercise should realize 
the comparative potential. It is not necessary to say that the same 
type of customary reasoning is at work in both cases; that will never 
be true. As with any comparative study, the community values un-
derlying the customs probably will be very different. That difference 
makes the inquiry all the more fascinating, increasing the likelihood 
of learning and retention. For example, Professor Williams noted 
that when he teaches commercial law, he points to the harmonizing 
orientation in tribal court opinions: 
[T]ribal courts seek to repair relationships even in the commercial 
context. Thus it is not unusual to witness a tribal court order a 
party to apologize, to ask for [forgiveness], and to make restitution. 
Common to most Indian tribes is the heartfelt belief that no indi-
vidual, and by extension no commercial activity, is more important 
than the harmony of life.263
Here, it would be both fruitless and unnecessary to idealize that the 
same values that underscored the validation of the Napyer mar-
riage—which include the very survival of a culture and people—are 
the same as would underscore the need to protect minors in the 
Western culture from the consequences of a disparate capacity to 
bargain at arm’s length. 
 The Napyer exercise can be extended to build critical reading 
skills into the lesson. In another written question, I ask the students 
to think about the Napyer case and to distinguish between what 
parts of the decision come from customary law and what parts come 
from statutes, including the provision allowing the court to consider 
customary law in the first place. I also ask them to comment on 
whether the court should use customary reasoning when there is a 
suitable written code provision in place. This can lead to an interest-
ing discussion about societal values. For example, speaking overly 
generally, Western or Westernized legal systems may place a pre-
mium on written law—perhaps because it can be ascertained by a 
comparably very large and presumably diverse population—while 
indigenous societies, often also plural on a smaller scale, may better 
value orally transmitted law or traditional practices because they 
                                                                                                                    
 263. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law, supra note 185, at 569. 
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play an important role in that community’s efforts to survive with its 
culture, language, values, and lineage intact. 
 While it may sound complex and involved, the entire discussion of 
customary law might take only about twenty minutes, divided be-
tween two class periods devoted to introducing legal reasoning. The  
students should only spend about twenty to thirty minutes on the ex-
ercise. Most class time is spent on rules and analogies, a moderate 
portion on policy, and the smallest increments on custom, principle, 
and narrative. 
 In summary, using tribal law examples to demonstrate a modern, 
domestic use for customary law opens students to the possibility that 
sources of law can derive from places beyond cases, statutes, and 
regulations. By taking off the blinders of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence 
early, in the first few weeks of legal education, we may increase the 
chances that students will develop a category for deeper, original 
thinking and problem solving. 
 In the first semester of legal writing, which usually focuses on ob-
jective analysis for purposes of advising a client, the student can con-
sider what would happen if a client had a problem that had not yet 
been addressed by statute or case law or was still so little explored 
that the law was unsettled. It is not hard to envision such a situation 
in the new frontier of cyberspace, for example.264 As the consulting 
attorney, where can the student turn for authority after laying the 
necessary groundwork in existing written law? After completing this 
exercise, one might see that a possible avenue is to look to the usage 
in that community. 
D.   Selection of Authority and the Path of Review 
 Novice law students often are flummoxed by the notion that the 
U.S. Supreme Court cannot decide every single legal issue within its 
borders with finality—that it must defer to other courts in some cas-
es. The confusion about which courts can review which matters leads 
to difficulty in selecting authorities—for example, in determining 
which court’s case law is binding versus merely persuasive. Tradi-
tionally, we ask students merely to memorize the axiom that state 
courts have the “last word” on issues of state law and the federal 
courts are the ones finally to decide issues of federal law. But we do 
not often challenge them to understand why our federal system oper-
                                                                                                                    
 264. See PRZEMYSLAW PAUL POLANSKI, CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE INTERNET: IN THE 
SEARCH FOR A SUPRANATIONAL CYBERSPACE LAW 111-18, 137-41 (2007); see also Scott 
Glover & P.J. Huffstutter, Alleged MySpace ‘Cyber-Bully’ Indicted in Teen’s Suicide, L.A.
TIMES, May 16, 2008, at B1 (reporting a notorious, recent cyber-bullying case that resulted 
in a teen’s suicide and raised difficult questions about the application of statutes that did 
not contemplate this novel situation). 
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ates in this way, which, in our example, would empower them to rea-
son through the authority selection problem independently. 
 In the first week of my class, I sometimes ask students to perform 
two short exercises designed to illustrate why this is so. I decided to 
compare a state/federal example to a tribal/federal example. I intro-
duce the tribal example first because students usually come to this 
comparative law example with few preconceived notions about the 
answer or how the intersovereign relationship should work.  
 In the tribal-federal example, which is borrowed from Professors 
Clinton, Goldberg, and Tsosie, I asked students to read short ex-
cerpts from two cases lying at the foundation of the tribal-federal re-
lationship, Talton v. Mayes265 and United States v. Wheeler,266 as well 
as the quote about sovereignty from Dagmar Thorpe above.267 In 
those cases, the Court looked at tribal histories and recognized Tri-
bes’ status as independent, foreign nations with the power to decide 
their own internal matters despite the threat of hegemony from state 
or U.S. law.268 In Talton, the Court held that the Cherokee (Tsalagi) 
Nation was not subject to the Grand Jury requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The question posed asked the 
students to think about the commonalities among all the authorities 
and to synthesize a principle:269 To what extent do the holdings and 
rationale in Talton and Wheeler support the descriptions of tribal so-
vereignty provided by the Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs and 
Dagmar Thorpe?270
 Students routinely identified sovereignty as the governing prin-
ciple in the Court’s decisions not to impose state or federal law on the 
Tribe’s decisionmaking process, regardless of their later grade per-
formance in the course. Compare these two responses from students 
who later performed at opposite ends of the curve in the course: 
The Nation believed that their sovereignty was from their Creator, 
and no one had the right to rule them. Their sovereignty could not 
be removed or given away to others. They had a right to create 
their laws to govern their people and property without outside in-
terference. The U.S. Courts recognized these inherent powers that 
existed prior to the Constitution, and concluded that these powers 
should still be exercised by individual Nations. 
                                                                                                                    
 265. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 266. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 267. Thorpe, supra note 40. 
 268. The idea to juxtapose these three sources comes directly from the introduction to 
tribal sovereignty in CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 219-30. 
 269. In this aspect, the exercise also starts to prepare students in the first week to 
think about distilling abstract principles from multiple sources in the process most legal 
writing professors refer to as the synthesis of a rule from multiple authorities. 
 270. The question posed also comes from CLINTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 220. 
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* * * 
Both cases look at the issue of tribal sovereignty and the ability of 
the tribes to infer judgment. They both seem to look at the history 
of the tribes, and the fact that they previously had sovereignty in 
these areas, and [that] not by implicitly or explicitly relinquishing 
this right, they maintain it. The parallels between these two cases 
and the Mohawk Nation Council of Chiefs and Dagmar Thorpe 
seems to hinge on the idea that they are a sovereign nation, 
granted these rights by a creator, and that these rights have not 
been abandoned. Therefore the rights are retained. 
It is difficult to distinguish between the two answers. This was cha-
racteristic of the class’s performance throughout the rest of the year 
on issues of selecting authority based on which sovereign’s internal 
interests were at stake. 
 In the state/federal example, students were asked to read selec-
tions from the Johns & Perschbacher tome, The United States Legal 
System: An Introduction,271 a text they are assigned for their orienta-
tion week program. The selections consist of a short reading on “mul-
tiple sovereignties” in the federal system, namely, the state and fed-
eral sovereigns. Then they were asked to answer a question designed 
to draw out the proper path of appeal. In the question, the California 
Supreme Court holds that a California statute requiring parental 
consent for abortion violates the California Constitution, which is 
broader than the Federal Constitution. Students are asked whether 
the California Attorney General can appeal the decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.272 The answer requires them to determine whether 
they have encountered a state or federal issue and then to identify 
the path of appeal. 
 In their responses, students implicitly are being asked to incorpo-
rate their reading about sovereignty. On only their second day of 
class in law school, fifteen of the twenty students in the class ans-
wered the question correctly, reasoning that the California Supreme 
Court must make the final decision because (1) the laws of its sove-
reign were implicated; and (2) the Supremacy Clause was not trig-
gered because California’s Constitution offered the broader protec-
tion. For example, these responses come from a high-performing stu-
dent and an average-performing student:  
Unless said abortion practices violate federal law, the United 
States Supreme Court would not hear this case. State govern-
ments are considered sovereign and free to draft their [own] laws 
so long as the law does not conflict with federal laws. For this case 
                                                                                                                    
 271. MARGARET Z. JOHNS & REX R. PERSCHBACHER, THE UNITED STATES LEGAL 
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION (2002). 
 272. Id. at 103. 
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to be heard by the US Supreme Court, the abortion practices 
would have to be outlawed by federal law. If this was the case, the 
federal government could apply the Supremacy Clause to preempt 
California from drafting such a law. 
* * *  
I felt [at] first that the supremacy clause, which gives the federal 
government the ability to supersede state law over specific federal 
matters, would apply. . . . I reexamined from the text how the fed-
eral government received its powers. The states gave the power to 
the federal government over specific matters. Abortion would seem 
like a state matter . . . thus the state supreme court is the highest 
court that should [hear] this case . . . .  
We followed these two exercises in class with a discussion about how 
sovereignty operates as the fundamental principle in deciding which 
court has the “last word” on the law of a particular land.273 From a 
purely experiential viewpoint that is difficult to measure objectively, 
students seemed to perform better over the previous year in their 
ability to select and apply the proper binding source. For example, 
the previous year, students had some difficulty choosing between a 
federal and state statute as the binding authority for an attorney fee 
question arising from a state law cause of action under the Kansas 
Uniform Commercial Code.274 We had to spend a considerable 
amount of time reviewing the rote material from the textbook in 
class. The following year, after the comparative example, no such 
problems were noted even in early memos, and some students even 
routinely added parenthetical explanations regarding the weight of 
authority when using persuasive sources in their open research memos. 
 When students receive more examples of how sovereigns evolved 
in the federal system, they can exercise critical thinking to identify 
patterns and construct for themselves the basic framework for Amer-
ican federalism: that states and Native American nations “came be-
fore” and therefore, their political sovereignty theoretically should be 
general, with limitations to be given up voluntarily—by ratification 
                                                                                                                    
 273. In appeals from tribal courts on federal issues, the federal district courts often ap-
ply a tribal abstention or exhaustion doctrine, often inconsistently and problematically. See 
generally Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court 
Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (1998) (exploring the tribal court abstention/exhaustion 
doctrine generally). 
 274. It is possible that in the fall semester students may have been confused as to the 
state-law basis for any “uniform” act, but the secondary status of uniform and model laws 
already was discussed thoroughly in class in research exercises on secondary sources and 
in the introduction to reading statutes, which used the Kansas Commercial Code in an ef-
fort to streamline exercises with the current writing assignment. 
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or treaty—or, in the case of Tribal nations, chipped away by force.275
This principle helps to identify when state courts usually will have 
general, not limited, jurisdiction and which primary authorities go-
vern a problem. 
 For example, it is because the states and Tribes are sovereign that 
their internal courts alone have the authority to decide matters pure-
ly of intrastate or intratribal concern. The Kansas Supreme Court 
alone can say decisively what the Kansas Constitution means; the 
U.S. Supreme Court cannot. And, assuming the system functions 
properly, only the Navajo Supreme Court can say with finality what 
its own code provisions mean. Viewed another way, which sovereign’s 
court system has final authority in a given matter versus the federal 
government depends on whether it involves the interpretation of fed-
eral law. By contrast, because the states and Tribes both have gener-
al powers over their internal affairs, jurisdiction and choice of law in 
disputes between the two is much more complicated. 
 In review, once the learning group establishes some definitions for 
sovereignty, it can explore details that will help it to determine the 
weight of authority. For example, using principles of sovereignty, 
students can now evaluate which jurisdiction has the “last word” on a 
given legal issue from a place of philosophical and political under-
standing rather than by sheer, rote memorization. The lines are not 
always clear: constant tension exists among and between all three 
sovereign types, as well as among the many individual sovereigns 
themselves, e.g., interstate and intertribal disputes. But students are 
better prepared to identify those complex issues and to exercise pro-
fessional judgment about what law applies. 
E.   Cultural Literacy Skills, Case Theory, and Narrative Reasoning 
 Because earlier Sections of this Article addressed how compara-
tive tribal legal studies enhance cultural literacy, this Section will fo-
cus more narrowly on the role of tribal and Indian law writing as-
signments as tools for teaching the cultural literacy component of 
professional skills courses. In those legal methods courses that also 
incorporate other simulated clinical components like client counsel-
ing, negotiation, and so on, the opportunities for training in cross-
cultural awareness are even greater. Moreover, a problem containing 
cultural diversity issues creates an excellent springboard for teach-
ing audience considerations in professional letter writing. 
 Of course, it is not necessary to use a tribal law or Indian law 
problem in order to carry out this goal, but such assignments offer 
                                                                                                                    
 275. This point is not intended to condone the historical use of a “state’s rights” argu-
ment to oppose federal civil rights initiatives, but rather to identify the roots of such 
movements, benign or not, in original sovereignty. 
822 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:765 
the added benefit of learning through domestic comparative exam-
ples. Professor Blumenfeld explores some of the reasons why.276 First, 
because legal writing courses use contextual learning, they provide 
the time to deeply explore one very narrow question within its social 
context.277 Because federal Indian law is such a complex topic, other 
first-year courses can only reasonably introduce the topic in much 
smaller servings—usually simplified out of necessity. Thus, legal 
writing is one of the best courses for introducing federal Indian law 
during the first year. 
 As an added benefit, students tend to become more engaged in the 
issues presented in long-term, rather than short-term projects278 be-
cause, like any lawyer immersed in a case, they become experts on 
that narrow topic. Therefore, it is more likely that students who 
write on federal Indian law in their first-year legal method courses 
will become interested in taking upper-level courses in that area279—
another way to ameliorate the marginalization of Indian law in edu-
cation and in our collective legal consciousness. 
 Cases with diverse cultural contexts can also teach important 
communication skills for working with clients. Such a case framed 
within a federal Indian law problem can simultaneously teach stu-
dents not only about cultural literacy in client representation and 
case development, but also about the three-sovereign nature of the 
federal legal system and how it works in reality. How to develop a 
federal Indian law problem for cultural literacy and other pedagogi-
cal goals has already been addressed in at least two articles,280 and 
those lessons will not be repeated here. 
 When developing the cultural literacy component of a writing 
problem, it is important to incorporate some history and evidence of 
the different players’ cultural reference points.281 When there is suffi-
cient evidence of the social, cultural, and racial considerations behind 
the different actors’ beliefs and actions, students can learn how narr-
                                                                                                                    
 276. See Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 506-12. 
 277. See id. at 506. 
 278. See id. at 507 & n.14.  
 279. See id.
 280. See id. at 508-19; Calleros, Exploring Racial Context, supra note 137, at 282-97. In 
addition to the other electronic materials cited by Professor Blumenfeld, I also suggest the 
enormously popular Native American news website, Indianz.com, the news and events 
page for the Native American Rights Fund, www.narf.org/events/news.htm, and Turtle 
Talk, a very active and informative blog run by the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at 
Michigan State University College of Law, at turtletalk.wordpress.com. Professor Blumen-
feld notes that one can also review cases on appeal to find appropriate issues to use in 
problems. Blumenfeld, supra note 6, at 510. For a detailed discussion of how to use authen-
tic cases to develop writing problems, see generally Elizabeth L. Inglehart & Martha Kan-
ter, “The Real World”: Creating a Compelling Appellate Brief Assignment Based on a Real-
World Case, 17 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING L. RESEARCH & WRITING 128 (2009). 
 281. See Calleros, Exploring Racial Context, supra note 137, at 286-91. 
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ative and critical legal theory play into their development of the 
theory of a case when diverse actors are present in a case. For exam-
ple, in the Hmong hunting case mentioned earlier,282 a good defense 
attorney will make sure that the narrative reasoning and the defense 
theory rest at least in part on the client’s cultural orientation toward 
private and collective property. In this real, ripped-from-the-
headlines case, a Hmong immigrant, Mr. Chai Vang, was hunting for 
food in Wisconsin and stumbled onto private property. He became in-
volved in a violent altercation with six hunter/property owners and 
killed them with his semiautomatic rifle.283 As cultural outsiders to 
the indigenous Hmong people of Vietnam, we can only conjecture, 
but this cultural divide caused by a difference in culture and legal 
philosophy may have helped to create the tragic turn of events. As 
Professor Anderson put it, “If hunting is seen as a necessity rather 
than a sport, depriving a Hmong [person] of access to hunting land 
might be somewhat equivalent to depriving Americans of access to 
breathable air.”284
 In a Chicano/a example, Calleros developed a contract damages 
problem based on a tailor’s ruination of several special dresses for a 
young woman’s coming-of-age ceremony and celebration, the Quin-
ceañera.285 By providing the students with witness testimony about 
the importance of this once-in-a-lifetime event to the young Chicana 
plaintiff within the context of its greater importance to her communi-
ty, including religious, social, and ethnic relevance, he provided the 
raw materials for a powerful contextual narrative.286
 When exploring the opportunities for teaching narrative and cul-
tural literacy, we travel much further along the spectrum toward the 
need for greater cultural context. This is not impossible to do with 
some research, although care must be taken to use indigenous 
sources for information. The great Native American scholar and ac-
                                                                                                                    
 282. Anderson, supra note 184. 
 283. Id. at 544 & n.24 (explaining the case and citing to the electronic newspaper report). 
 284. Id. at 544. 
 285. Calleros, Exploring Racial Context, supra note 137, at 289-90. 
 286. In one of my appellate assignments, I tried to do something similar based on a 
case with which I had experience in practice. It involved a young indigenous, Tibetan 
woman’s application for political asylum in the post-9/11 United States. One of the most 
troubling aspects of the USA PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts has been to bar applicants who 
have been the victims of kidnapping or coerced assistance by congressionally defined ter-
rorist groups. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (inadmissible aliens); id. § 1158(b) (conditions for 
granting asylum); id. § 1231(a)(3) (detention and removal of aliens ordered removed). The 
legal problem required detailed statutory and regulatory interpretation. But the narrative 
was the true center of the theory of the case. I gathered materials designed to educate the 
student attorneys about the applicant’s Tibetan heritage, including her own personal sto-
ries of abuse at the army’s hands during China’s colonial and military occupation and 
about the status and living conditions of refugees in Nepal. It took some time to gather 
country studies, first-hand accounts, and so on, but it was fascinating work and work that 
probably would gladly be shared by an eager research or teaching assistant. 
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tivist Vine Deloria, Jr., like many others, pointed out that outsiders 
often make the mistake of learning about Native American peoples 
by talking to other outsiders instead of to the people themselves.287 In 
fact, to do so without knowing which sources can be trusted may be 
dangerous and inadvertently insulting. Instead, it is recommended to 
go to real court records for inspiration or to consult Native American 
scholars and lawyers who can help prevent the misunderstanding—
or even inadvertent exploitation—that sometimes occurs during in-
artful cross-cultural communication. 
 I have not found the time investment in performing this research 
any more onerous than creating other rich and compelling legal writ-
ing assignments. The safest approach is to model simulated cases on 
real cases involving Native Americans and their stories, as in the 
sample problems developed by Professors Calleros and Blumenfeld. 
For example, this spring, I will base an appellate brief assignment on 
an eagle feather case pending in the Tenth Circuit, which implicates 
federal eagle preservation laws, religious freedom, indigenous cul-
tural sovereignty and property, and Indian status under federal law.  
 With this simple decisionmaking rubric in mind, we can see that 
not only is indigenous law a fertile ground for learning, but we also 
need not sacrifice ourselves in the process. Because I currently teach 
legal writing, I took a keen interest in Calleros’ approach. It is my 
hope, however, that professors across all disciplines will adapt their 
courses in a similar way, in order to accommodate topics such as cul-
tural literacy and the three-sovereign model of government. 
VII.   OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
 Comparative studies are valuable tools in both the doctrinal and 
skills classrooms, in that the abilities developed in understanding 
the underpinnings of tribal sovereignty, and the way that it plays out 
in daily practice, can be applied to other areas of law. As with many 
of the applications for Indian and tribal law in the first-year class-
room, a brief introduction and illustration is all that is required to 
pique interest and to create the kind of energized atmosphere  
that Professor Weyrauch noticed when he introduced Roma law  
into his comparative law course.288 Taking a few small risks with  
experimentation will open a world of fascination for the entire learn-
ing community. 
                                                                                                                    
 287. Jensen, supra note 157 (“Somehow it is presumed that scientists, and thus Euro-
peans, know better than the Indians themselves how Indians got here and how they lived 
prior to Columbus. That attitude is patronizing at best. Instead of digging and analyzing, 
why don’t researchers just ask the Indians? And then, having asked, why don’t they take 
the answers seriously?”). 
 288. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 133. 
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 Even more importantly, introducing tribal and federal Indian law 
concepts into the general law school curriculum can create more hu-
mane lawyers with enhanced cultural literacy skills and increased 
respect for tribal sovereignty as well as the tribal courts and clients 
they are bound to encounter in their practice. Doing so also has the 
capacity to create an academic environment of recognition and re-
spect toward Native American students and faculty. Understanding 
tribal law lends itself seamlessly to, and illustrates the centrality of, 
the pursuit of critical legal studies. 
 For future attorneys and policy makers of both Native and non-
Native descent, my widest, most idealistic wish is that an encounter 
with this material, however brief, might act as one thin strand of in-
fluence within the stronger cord of many others, leading to a re-
envisioning of their careers within a future described by Dr. John 
Mohawk289 as a “postconquest, postmodernist, postprogressive era.”290
  Given the perfect storm of political, economic, environmental, cul-
tural, and legal issues gathering on the horizon, the need for this vi-
sion has never spoken so loudly, or so clearly as it does right now, at 
this very delicate moment. 
                                                                                                                    
 289. The late Dr. Mohawk was the former editor of Akwesasne Notes, an influential 
Native American publication. 
 290. Greg Cajete et al., Re-Indigenization Defined, in ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS:
INDIGENOUS TEACHINGS FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 255 (Melissa K. Nelson ed., 2008).  
826 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:765 
